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Abstract 
The South African Parliament established a tax Ombud to act as an oversight body which 
reviews administrative complaints against SARS. Concerns have, however, been raised by 
academics and experts that the tax Ombud is not adequately independent of SARS so as to be 
able to investigate the complaints effectively and without bias. The manner in which the 
appointment, funding and staffing of the tax Ombud have been provided for, have been cited 
as the major sources of the perception of impartiality. According to decisions of the highest 
courts in South Africa, the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test must be applied in cases where 
institutional bias is alleged. The test investigates whether or not the reasonable person would 
suspect that the particular decision maker will be biased, due to institutional factors. After 
applying the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test to the model of the South African tax 
Ombud, the conclusion reached is that the model of the tax Ombud gives rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of bias. Notwithstanding the fact that the model gives rise to a suspicion of bias, it 
is concluded that the model, in its current form, remains fair as safeguards have been put in 
place by the legislature to ensure that fairness prevails. There is, however, international 
precedent which suggests that the sources of institutional bias can be eliminated completely 
from the model of the tax Ombud. Specifically, if the funding and staffing of the tax 
Ombud’s office is removed from SARS, the model of the tax Ombud would move closer to 
the ideal standards of fairness.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Context of the research 
Following recommendations of the Katz Commission (1995) regarding deficiencies in tax 
complaints resolution processes, Parliament responded by providing for the establishment of 
the Office of the tax Ombud in section 14 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
In deciding on a model for the establishment of the South African tax Ombud, South African 
lawmakers considered a number of international models of similar oversight bodies. 
Specifically, Parliament examined oversight bodies in the United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Botswana, the United States of America and Sweden (Parliament Standing 
Committee on Finance, 2011).   
The introduction of the tax Ombud has been welcomed by academics and tax experts, but 
reservations have been expressed over the model chosen. It has been argued that instead of 
creating the Office of the tax Ombud within the statutory framework of the Tax 
Administration Act, the Ombud should have rather been established in terms of a separate 
Act of Parliament to safeguard the independence of his office (Ofori-Boateng, 2014). It has 
also been suggested that in order to secure the impartiality of the office, the power to appoint 
and dismiss the Ombud should have been vested in a legislative body and not the Minister of 
Finance (Ofori-Boateng, 2014). This sentiment is shared by certain tax experts who contend 
that the tax Ombud should be accountable to Parliament for greater independence (Klue, in 
du Preez, 2011).   
Other aspects providing for the establishment and operations of the tax Ombud have also met 
with disapproval. Section 15 of the Tax Administration Act provides that the staff of the 
office of the Ombud must be appointed in terms of the South African Revenue Service Act, 
34 of 1997. This section (at sub-section (4)) goes on to provide that expenditure incurred in 
the operations of the tax Ombud must be paid from the funds of the South African Revenue 
Service (referred to as “SARS”). Professor Mollagee argues that the tax Ombud will never be 
truly independent if the costs are paid by SARS and the staff are employed by SARS 
(Mollagee, in du Preez, 2011).  
It is submitted that most of the concerns raised about the model relate to the impartiality and 
independence of the tax Ombud. The criticism levelled against the chosen model for the 
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South African Ombud can be summed as follows: the model for the establishment of the tax 
Ombud creates the perception that the Ombud does not function independently and is biased 
in favour of SARS. The offending provisions are those related to the appointment, staffing 
and funding of the tax Ombud. 
When the South African Parliament began the process of considering the appointment of a 
tax Ombud, only three of the seven countries whose models where consulted had dedicated 
oversight bodies dealing solely with taxpayers’ complaints about the collector of revenue. 
These countries are the United Kingdom (referred to as the UK), the United States of 
America (referred to as the USA) and Canada.  
From the first day of May 2015, however, the function of investigating complaints related to 
the maladministration of the Australian Tax Office has been moved from the Commonwealth 
Ombud to the Inspector General of Taxes (Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Auditing, 
2012). Since the transfer of this function to the Inspector General of Taxes, that office is now 
the single body committed to investigating and addressing consumer complaints about the 
Australian Tax Office. As the function of addressing taxpayer’s complaints was only recently 
moved from the Commonwealth Ombud to the Inspector General of Taxes, the Inspector 
General of Taxes model did not form part of Parliament’s analysis. 
It is unfortunate that the Inspector General of Taxes model was not considered because it 
possesses traits which go some way in addressing the criticisms levelled against the South 
African tax Ombud. For instance, the staff of the Australian Inspector General of Taxes are 
appointed in terms of the Public Service Act, 147 of 1999. This means that the terms and 
conditions of the employment of the Inspector General of Taxes staff are not decided by the 
Australian Tax Office, as is the case with the South African tax Ombud and SARS. 
Furthermore, funding for the Inspector General of Taxes comes directly from the Australian 
Federal Budget and not from the Australian Tax Office.  
Notwithstanding the criticism levelled against the chosen model for the South African tax 
Ombud, South African lawmakers assert that in deciding on a model they were mindful of the 
fact that the chosen model had to fit into South Africa’s constitutional and legal context 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). It therefore begs the question whether or 
not the model chosen by Parliament does indeed fit into the South Africa’s legal and 
constitutional context as asserted. 
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In order to determine whether or not Parliament is correct in its assertions, the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), of 1996, will serve 
as the starting point of the inquiry. The function of the Constitution as the yardstick by which 
all legislation can be tested is established in section 2, which declares that the Constitution is 
the supreme law of the land and any law inconsistent with it is invalid. 
In the case of BTR Industries South Africa v Metal and Allied Workers Union (hereinafter 
referred to as BTR) 1992 (3) SA 673 (A) the Appellate Court held that the test for 
determining bias in South Africa is the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test. A “suspicion”, it 
was held (at 690), can be sustained even without actual proof of the existence of bias.  It was 
held by the Appellate Court (at 695) that in applying the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test it 
must be determined whether or not the reasonable man in the litigant’s circumstances would 
harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias. The reasonable man, it was held (at 695), is one 
endowed with ordinary intelligence, knowledge and common sense. The test is essentially an 
objective one; however, the unique circumstances of each case could not be ignored. As the 
test is an objective one, it was held (at 695) that its application cannot be varied based on a 
litigant’s individual superstitions or peculiar sensitivities. 
In the case of Islamic Unity Convention v Minister of Telecommunications (hereinafter 
referred to as Islamic Unity) 2008 (3) SA 383 (CC) the Constitutional Court (at 403) 
explained that in cases of institutional bias, the suspicion of bias is linked to the relationship 
of influence and dependency at a structural level. The allegation is essentially that the 
decision-maker is inevitably biased due to institutional factors instead of personal traits.  
The Constitutional Court (at 411) approved of the test in BTR in deciding cases of 
institutional bias and adapted the test to cases where institutional bias is alleged. In such cases 
it was held that a court must determine whether or not a reasonable person, in the position of 
the person alleging bias, would reasonably apprehend that the institution making the decision 
will not be independent, impartial or fair in deciding a matter before it. 
In the Islamic Unity case, the Constitutional Court intimated (at 406) that where an 
institution’s processes are tainted with a suspicion of bias, the procedure can be cured if there 
are safeguards to ensure that the process is ultimately a fair one. The court shed light on the 
kind of safeguards which could ensure that an otherwise biased process remains fair.  The 
court held (at 407) that the fact that the relevant legislation dictated that the decision maker 
should be a judge of the High Court or an experienced legal professional was a step in 
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ensuring that the process followed in resolving a dispute is a fair one. It was also held (at 
407) that the fact that recommendations of the decision maker are not binding is a further 
safeguard in ensuring that an otherwise prima facie partial process did not result in unfair 
outcomes. Ultimately, it was held (at 411) that the constitutional right to just administrative 
action, when asserted, must be reviewed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. 
Criticism has been directed at the manner in which the South African tax Ombud has been 
established. The claims are that the model creates the perception that the tax Ombud is not 
independent of SARS and consequently inherently biased. The judgment of the Constitutional 
Court in the Islamic Unity decision raises the question whether or not the South African 
model of the tax Ombud does indeed fit into South Africa’s constitutional and legal context. 
It must be determined whether or not, based on South Africa’s current legal test of 
institutional bias, the legislature has gone far enough in ensuring the fairness of the model of 
the tax Ombud. 
1.2 Research Goals 
In light of claims that the tax Ombud is inherently biased in favour of SARS due to its 
closeness to the collector of revenue, the South African legal test for institutional bias will be 
applied to the model of the tax Ombud.  The goal of this research is to determine whether or 
not the chosen model for the establishment of the South African tax Ombud fits into South 
Africa’s constitutional and legal context. The purpose of applying the test will be to 
determine whether or not Parliament has done enough to ensure that the model conforms to 
the Constitution and if more can still be done. In doing this, the following sub-goals will be 
addressed: 
• determining the process by which the South African tax Ombud was established by 
analysing the various Ombud models considered in the process of developing the 
model for the South African tax Ombud;  
• determining which aspects of tax complaint oversight bodies considered by Parliament 
were eventually incorporated into the model of the tax Ombud and establishing 
whether or not these models, or any other models, offer solutions to concerns raised by 
critics over the model of the tax Ombud; 
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• analysing the South African judicial tests for determining bias with a view to 
determining the correct approach for investigating allegations of bias at an institutional 
level; and 
• applying the judicial test for institutional bias to the provisions of the Tax 
Administration Act which establish and regulate the mandate of the tax Ombud and, 
based on the test, determine whether or not Parliament did enough to ensure that the 
establishment of the tax Ombud conformed to the requirements of the Constitution. 
1.3 Research methods and design 
A critical approach will be adopted for the present research as it seeks to analyse and critique 
pre-established views and knowledge (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). The research methodology 
to be applied can be described as a doctrinal research methodology. This methodology 
provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing the determination of a constitutional 
challenge based on allegations of administrative bias, analyses the relationships between the 
rules, explains areas of difficulty and is based purely on documentary data (McKerchar, 
2014). 
The documentary data to be used for the research consists of  
• Legislation: the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011 (with particular reference to the 
provisions of Part F of the Act); the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996; the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000; the Inspector-General 
of Taxation Act, 28 of 2003; the Public Service Act, 147 of 1999; the Botswana 
Ombudsman Act 5, 1995; 
• Parliamentary reports; 
• relevant case law; 
• articles in accredited journals; 
• textbooks and other writings. 
The research is conducted in the form of an extended argument, supported by documentary 
evidence. The validity and reliability of the research and the conclusions will be ensured by: 
• adhering to the rules of the statutory interpretation, as established in terms of statute 
and common law; 
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• placing greater evidential weight on legislation, case law which creates precedent or 
which is of persuasive value (primary data) and the writings of acknowledged experts 
in the field; 
• discussing opposing viewpoints and concluding, based on a preponderance of credible 
evidence; and 
• the rigour of the arguments. 
As all the data are in the public domain, no ethical considerations arise in relation to the use 
of the data. Interviews will not be conducted; opinions will be considered in their written 
form. 
1.4 Overview 
This thesis will be presented in the following structure: 
Chapter 2 will outline the background leading to the establishment of the South African tax 
Ombud. The models of tax oversight bodies considered by the South African Parliament in 
developing a model for a tax Ombud will be reviewed. Parliament’s Standing Committee on 
Finance’s views on each model will be included to gain insight into the reasoning process 
behind Parliament’s deliberations. 
Chapter 3 will review the model of the tax Ombud which was eventually settled on by the 
legislature. The elements incorporated into the model of the tax Ombud from tax complaints 
oversight models consulted by Parliament will be identified and criticism levelled by critics 
and academics against the model of the South African tax Ombud will also be discussed. The 
model of the recently established Australian Inspector General of Taxation will be reviewed 
with the aim of finding any insights into alternative ways of establishing a tax complaint 
oversight body. 
Chapter 4 will attempt to define the legal and constitutional framework in which the model of 
the tax Ombud can be scrutinised for lawfulness. The applicable judicial test for institutional 
bias, as expounded by the highest courts in South Africa, will be analysed and it will be 
determined whether or not the test can be applied to the provisions of Part F of the Tax 
Administration Act which outline the model of the tax Ombud.   
Chapter 5 of this thesis will apply the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test to the provisions of 
the Tax Administration Act which regulate how the tax Ombud must operate.  Based on the 
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outcome of the test, recommendations will be made on how to improve on the current model 
of the South African tax Ombud. 
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CHAPTER 2: Review of international models of tax complaints oversight institutions 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the different tax complaint-oversight models which formed the 
basis of the South African Parliament’s deliberations in deciding on a model of a South 
African tax Ombud. This Chapter will attempt to reveal Parliament’s aims and reasoning 
process in the manner in which it used the different models to establish its own model. 
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance’s actual remarks on the usefulness of the 
different models in a South African context will also be included.  
This chapter will aim to address the first goal of this research which is the determination of 
the process by which the South African tax Ombud was established. In doing this, the various 
tax complaints oversight models considered in the process of developing a model for the 
South African tax Ombud will be analysed.  
2.2 Report of the Katz Commission of Inquiry 
The Katz Commission or formally, the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of South 
Africa’s tax system, was appointed in 1994 and tasked with producing reports on various 
aspects of South Africa’s tax structure (Davis Tax Committee, 2014). The Katz Commission 
submitted nine interim reports to Parliament in the period between 1994 and 1999. 
In its third report to Parliament, the Katz Commission identified areas which needed reform 
in South Africa’s tax structure. It was reported that in the absence of an intermediary, the 
only course of action for an aggrieved taxpayer would be “fruitless protest or costly 
litigation” (Katz Commission, 1995). The Commission determined that the Public Protector, 
then provided for in the interim Constitution of South Africa, occupied the role of ultimate 
intermediate protector of aggrieved taxpayers (Katz Commission, 1995). 
The office of the Public Protector was formally established in the final Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. The Public Protector is listed in section 181(1)(a) of the 
Constitution as one of the state institutions which support constitutional democracy. In terms 
of section 181(5) of the Constitution, state institutions established to support constitutional 
democracy are accountable only to the National Assembly. The Constitution (at section 
181(4)), provides that no organ of state or any other person may interfere with the functioning 
of state institutions established to foster constitutional democracy, including the office of the 
Public Protector. 
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The mandate of the Public Protector is wide. According to section 182(1)(a) of the 
Constitution, the Public Protector has the power to investigate alleged or suspected 
impropriety in the conduct of state affairs, public administration or any sphere of 
government. In terms of the Public Protector Act, 23 of 1994 (at section 6(4)(a)), the Public 
Protector can initiate an investigation into all kinds of improper conduct ranging from 
unlawful or improper enrichment to any act or omission which enriches or prejudices a 
person. The Public Protector is empowered by the Constitution (at section 182(b) and (c)) to 
report on the above mentioned conduct and to take remedial action.  
The Public Protector is established as an independent and impartial institution with wide 
ranging powers which it can use to execute its constitutional mandate. For instance, in terms 
of the Public Protector Act, 23 of 1994 (at section 7(4)(a)) the Public Protector may summon 
any person to appear before him or her and give evidence related to a matter under 
investigation. Witnesses may be called by the Public Protector to give evidence under sworn 
oath. In terms of the Public Protector Act (at section 7A(1)) the Public Protector can, 
pursuant to the issuing of a warrant, enter a premises and seize items on the premises which 
may have a bearing on an investigation.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Public Protector has a wide range of measures available to 
him or her to address misconduct in public administration, the Katz Commission determined 
that in some cases the office of the Public Protector could be viewed as too remote or too 
adversarial for dealing with minor disputes (Katz Commission, 1995). The Commission 
recommended that a more direct mediator was required to deal specifically with tax related 
grievances. The Katz Commission recommended that a mediator should be established based 
on the United Kingdom’s model of the Tax Adjudicator. The Katz Commission 
recommended that this direct mediator must be situated between the Public Protector and 
SARS’ own internal dispute resolution mechanisms (Parliament Standing Committee on 
Finance, 2011).    
In line with the recommendations of the Katz Commission, Parliament resolved that a 
mediator with the same powers and responsibilities as the Public Protector would intrude on 
the role of the Public Protector (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). 
Parliament eventually endeavoured to create a complaints handling body which did not have 
the wide reaching power of the Public Protector but which was also independent enough from 
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SARS to be able to investigate and monitor the revenue authority’s administrative functions 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011).     
2.3 The South African tax Ombud 
The South African Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance, which was tasked with 
reviewing the Katz Commission’s report, responded to the Commission’s recommendations 
by reviewing a number of possible models for the establishment of a tax Ombud. The 
Standing Committee did not restrict itself to just the United Kingdom’s Tax Adjudicator in its 
review of possible models, instead, it considered a number of international examples. 
Specifically, the South African Parliament considered models in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Botswana, the United States of America and Sweden 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011).   
At the time that the South African Parliament was deciding on a model for a tax Ombud, only 
three of the countries whose models were considered had oversight bodies dedicated to 
reviewing tax complaints. These countries are the United States of America, Canada and the 
United Kingdom. The rest of the countries, namely New Zealand, Botswana, Sweden and 
Australia did not have dedicated tax complaints oversight bodies but had other means by 
which taxpayers could address their grievances.  
Since the time when Parliament was considering a model for the South African tax Ombud, 
Australia has established its own dedicated tax complaint oversight body in the form of the 
Inspector General of Taxes. The details of Australia’s model of the Inspector General of 
Taxes will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
The following section of this chapter is an analysis of the different tax complaint oversight 
models which formed the basis of Parliament’s deliberations in developing the tax Ombud. 
The analysis consists of a two part examination. The first will be an analysis of those 
countries without a dedicated oversight body for taxpayer’s grievances, and the second, an 
examination of the countries with dedicated tax complaints oversight bodies.  
A discussion of each country’s model will be followed by a discussion of Parliament’s 
remarks regarding the efficacy of adopting the model in South Africa. The Parliamentary 
remarks have been included because it is submitted that they reveal the thought process 
behind the establishment of the tax Ombud. The remarks indicate Parliament’s commitment 
to positioning the Ombud in a particular way in relation to the other actors in the broader tax 
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dispute resolution framework. The remarks also reveal the underlying reasons behind why 
Parliament felt certain aspects of particular models would be beneficial to South Africa and 
other aspects could be rejected. 
2.4  Country models without a dedicated tax complaints oversight body 
2.4.1 The Swedish Ombud 
The earliest use of the concept of an Ombud arose in Sweden. The Swedish Ombud was 
established as early as 1810 and was created to serve as an oversight body which would act in 
the best interests of society (JO-Ombudsman, 2013).  The Ombud was established to act as a 
check on the authority of the State and was appointed by Parliament.  In more modern times 
the Swedish Ombud is still appointed by Parliament and forms part of Swedish Parliamentary 
control. The Ombud participates in the functions of Parliament responsible for examining the 
job performance of Ministers ensuring that citizens are treated in accordance with the law and 
also reviews how state resources are used (JO-Ombudsman, 2013).  
Mandate 
The mandate of the Swedish Ombud is wide and covers the supervision of the application of 
public laws, activities and regulations (JO-Ombudsman, 2013). The objective of the Ombud 
is to ensure that the public sector does not infringe on the fundamental rights of citizens (JO-
Ombudsman, 2015).  
Appointment  
In terms of the Riksdag Act (2014:801) (at Chapter 13, Article 2)  the Swedish Parliament 
must appoint four Ombuds which consist of one Chief Parliamentary Ombud and three 
Parliamentary Ombuds. A Deputy Ombud may also be appointed at the discretion of 
Parliament.  
The Swedish Ombuds are elected into office through a Parliamentary secret ballot. According 
to the Riksdag Act (at Chapter 13, Article 3) once elected, the Parliamentary Ombud must 
serve for a four year period before re-election. In terms of the Riksdag Act (at Chapter 13, 
Article 4) an Ombud may be removed from office before the expiration of the four year 
period if Parliament passes a vote that the Ombud has lost its confidence.  
The responsibilities of the Ombuds are split into areas. There are four areas and each area has 
specific departments which fall under it. The Ombud appointed to a particular area is 
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responsible for reviewing the functions of the organisations which fall under that area (JO-
Ombudsman, 2015). The Swedish tax authority and customs authorities fall under the 4th area 
of responsibility (JO-Ombudsman, 2015).  
The Swedish Ombud is appointed directly by Parliament and reports to Parliament by way of 
an annual report on his or her activities (JO-Ombudsman, 2013). 
Powers of Review 
The Swedish Ombud has the power to investigate conduct by any public official or executive, 
which is contrary to law or is otherwise improper (JO-Ombudsman, 2015b). According to the 
Swedish Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform (at Chapter 13 section 6) 
administrative authorities and employees of the State or municipalities must assist the Ombud 
in conducting an investigation by supplying him or her with the documentation and 
information requested.  
The Swedish Ombud has extensive authority and power in his or her investigations. In terms 
of the Kungörelse (at Chapter 13 section 6) the Public Prosecutor must assist the Ombud 
when called upon to criminally prosecute alleged perpetrators of an injustice. The Ombud has 
unconstrained access to the courts and administrative authorities’ documents and records. 
Staffing and Funding 
In addition to being able to call upon the respective Heads of Departments whose 
departments may be under investigation by an Ombud, the office of the Chief Ombud has an 
administrative department attached to it. The office of the Chief Ombud has control over the 
appointment of staff to its office and the offices of the Parliamentary Ombuds. Through its 
administrative department, the Chief Ombud hires human resources management, cleaning 
staff and administrative assistants (JO-Ombudsman, 2015). The Chief Ombud also has a unit 
for registration and archives which, as the name suggests, is responsible for registration and 
archiving information. 
The Swedish Ombuds are funded by the Swedish Parliament or Riksdag and it is the 
responsibility of the Chief Ombud to ensure that funds are used economically by the 
Parliamentary Ombuds (JO-Ombudsman, 2015c). 
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Parliamentary remarks 
As discussed above, Parliament took heed of the Katz Commission’s recommendations that 
the new tax intermediary should not function as a second Public Protector. Instead, it was 
recommended that the intermediary should be established to function between the Public 
Protector and SARS’ own dispute resolution mechanisms. In its review of the various tax 
complaints oversight models, the South African Parliament would not endorse a model in 
which the tax complaints oversight body had the power to report directly to Parliament 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). The South African Parliament shared the 
view of the Katz Commission that a tax complaint oversight body with the power to report 
directly to Parliament would mirror the powers and functions of the Public Protector 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). Even though not explicitly expressed by 
Parliament’s review committee, it is submitted that the model of the Swedish Ombud was 
rejected based on this premise.  
2.4.2 New Zealand Ombuds 
In terms of the Ombudsmen’s Act, 9 of 1975 (at section 13(1)), the mandate of an Ombud is 
to investigate any decisions or recommendations, or acts and omissions made by any of 
certain specified departments or organisations, which affect a person or group of persons. The 
only caveat to the exercise of the Ombud’s investigative powers is that the act, omission, 
recommendation or decision under investigation must relate to a matter of administration.  
Part 1 of the annexed schedule to the Ombudsmen’s Act includes the Inland Revenue 
Department in the list of Government departments to which the jurisdiction of an Ombud 
applies. It follows, therefore, that persons aggrieved by an administrative decision, 
recommendation, act or omission of the Inland Revenue Department can request an 
investigation into the matter from an Ombud.  
Under the Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 17(1)(a)) the Ombud may refuse to carry out an 
investigation if the complainant has failed, without due cause, to exhaust other available 
administrative processes to resolve the dispute. An Ombud will therefore usually require that 
a complainant utilise the dispute resolution processes available in the Internal Revenue 
Department first before he or she conducts an investigation into a complaint (Internal 
Revenue Department, 2008).  
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Powers of review 
An Ombud may conduct an investigation pursuant to a complaint or may initiate an 
investigation of his or her own volition. In terms of the Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 13(4)) 
the House of Representatives can call upon an Ombud to investigate any matter which is the 
subject of a petition before it and the Ombud must then submit a report to the House of 
Representatives in that regard. If, following the Ombud’s investigation, he or she reaches the 
conclusion that the decision, recommendation, act or omission under investigation was 
flawed or contrary to law, the Ombud may submit his or her opinion.  
The Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 22(3)) provides that the Ombud must report his or her 
opinion and the basis of the opinion to the department or organisation which is the subject of 
the investigation. A copy of the report must also be delivered to the relevant government 
official who oversees the department.   
The Ombud is also entitled to set a time period in which the relevant department or 
organisation under investigation must report the steps it has undertaken to give effect to the 
Ombud’s recommendation. The Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 22(4)) provides that if in the 
Ombud’s opinion, and at his or her discretion, insufficient or inadequate measures have been 
taken to give effect to his recommendations, the Ombud may escalate the recommendations 
to the Prime Minister or report to the House of Representatives thereafter. 
Appointment 
The Governor General of New Zealand must appoint one or more Ombuds as officers of 
Parliament. Whilst these appointments are made by a member of the executive in the form of 
the Governor General, in terms of the Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 3(2)) the Ombuds must 
be appointed based on recommendations from the House of Representatives. One of the 
Ombuds so appointed must be chosen to be the Chief Ombud by the Governor General and 
he or she is ultimately responsible for the administration of the Office of the Ombuds and the 
allocation and co-ordination of work between the other Ombuds (at section 3(4)). 
The term of appointment of each Ombud is capped in the Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 5(1)) 
at a period of five years with the possibility of re-appointment after the five year period. Once 
appointed, it is difficult to remove an Ombud from office. According to the Ombudsmen’s 
Act (section 6(1)) an Ombud may only be removed from office by the Governor General 
following recommendations from the House of Representatives. The recommendations must 
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allege that the particular Ombud is unable to perform his or her duties, has committed 
misconduct, has neglected his or her duty or is bankrupt. The Governor General may remove 
an Ombud from office on the above-mentioned grounds on his own, however such removal 
must be confirmed by the House of Representatives within two months of sitting in session.  
In terms of the Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 29), each Ombud must submit at least one 
report every year to the House of Representatives detailing how they have exercised their 
mandate.  
Funding and Staffing  
Section 31 of the Ombudsmen’s Act provides that the Parliament of New Zealand is 
responsible for paying for the expenditure related to the operations of the Ombud. Money 
must be appropriated annually for this purpose by the House of Representatives.  
In terms of section 11(1) of the Ombudsmen’s Act, the Chief Ombud may appoint officers 
and employees necessary for the performance of the duties prescribed by the Act. The Chief 
Ombud need not consult with a third party on his or her appointments as he or she has all the 
rights, powers and duties of an employer under the Ombudsmen’s Act (at section 11(2)). The 
staff appointed by the Chief Ombud do not constitute part of the New Zealand public service. 
Section 11(4) of the Ombudsmen’s Act provides that no person employed as a member of the 
Ombud’s staff shall be deemed to be employed in the New Zealand state sector by virtue of 
such employment.  
Parliamentary remarks 
The model of the New Zealand Ombuds relies on a system of a single Chief Ombud who co-
ordinates the activities of a number of other Ombuds in executing their mandate. 
Commenting on the model, the South African Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance 
implied that a model in which the tax complaint oversight body has the power to report 
directly to Parliament could intrude on the role of the Public Protector (Parliament Standing 
Committee on Finance, 2011).   
2.4.3 Botswana Ombud 
Similarly to New Zealand and Sweden, Botswana does not have a dedicated Ombud who 
deals solely with taxpayer’s complaints. Instead, a national Ombud was established by the 
Botswana Ombudsman Act 5, of 1995. 
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Mandate  
In terms of the Ombudsman Act (at section 3(1)) the mandate of the Botswana Ombud is to 
investigate the mal-performance of the administrative functions of a government department 
or any other authority to which the Botswana Ombudsman Act applies. Section 6(a) of the 
Ombudsman Act provides that the mandate of the Ombud applies to authorities who are 
empowered to enter into contracts on behalf of the government of Botswana. In terms of the 
Botswana United Revenue Service Act, 17 of 2004, the Botswana United Revenue Service is 
responsible for assessments and the collection of tax on behalf of the government of 
Botswana. It follows therefore that the Botswana Ombud has the mandate to investigate the 
mal-performance of the administrative functions of the Botswana United Revenue Service.  
In terms of the Ombudsman Act (at section 3(1)), the Ombud’s mandate is not restricted to 
investigating mal-administration in the Botswana United Revenue Service but extends to all 
government departments. Therefore, the Ombud or his staff need not necessarily be equipped 
with tax expertise, except to the extent that they are dealing with a complaint related to the 
Botswana United Revenue Service. 
Recommendations made by the Botswana Ombud pursuant to an investigation are compelling 
and must be taken seriously. According to section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act the Ombud 
can report to Parliament if no action is taken to remedy an injustice identified by his office.  
Powers of Review 
In terms of the Ombudsman Act (at section 3(1)(a) and (b)) the Ombud may initiate an 
investigation after receipt of a complaint from an aggrieved member of the public or at the 
behest of the President, a Minister or any member of the National Assembly. According to 
the Ombudsman Act (at section 3(1)(c)), investigations may also be commenced by the 
Ombud of his or her own initiative.  
In terms of the Ombudsman Act (at section 3(2)(a) and (b)), the Botswana Ombud is 
restricted from investigating complaints where the complainant has a right of appeal or 
review before a tribunal or where a remedy is available by way of proceedings in a court of 
law. The Ombud is however not precluded from pursuing an investigation by reason only that 
the complainant has a right of recourse in the High Court where it would be unreasonable to 
have expected the complainant to have resorted to the High Court. 
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The Botswana Ombud has the discretion to initiate, continue or discontinue an investigation 
and the Ombudsman Act (at section 3(5)) sets out the circumstances under which the Ombud 
may discontinue or refuse to pursue an investigation. Once an investigation has been 
initiated, the Act gives extensive power to the Ombud to carry out the investigation. In a 
manner which resembles the South African Public Protector’s evidence gathering powers, the 
Botswana Ombud has the same powers as the High Court with regard to the power to call 
witnesses for examination and request documentation. In terms of the Ombudsman Act (at 
section 7(6)) the Ombud has the same powers to compel a witness to give evidence as the 
High Court. Under section 7(4) and (5) of the Ombudsman Act, the Ombud also has the 
power to review privileged State documentation, except for documents relating to Cabinet 
meetings whose privacy is expressly requested by the President.   
Appointment 
According to the Ombudsman Act (at section 2(2)) the Ombud is appointed by the President 
after consultation with the leader of the opposition party. The Ombud is appointed for a 
period of four years after which he or she must vacate the position. It is apparent that once 
appointed, the Ombud enjoys the security of tenure of a High Court judge as he or she is not 
subject to the authority or control of any person and may only be dismissed under similar 
conditions necessary for the removal of a High Court judge (at section 2(6)).  
In terms of the Ombudsman Act (at section 9(2)) the Ombud must submit an annual report to 
the President which must be tabled before the National Assembly. 
Funding and Staffing 
In terms of section 13 of the Ombudsman Act, expenses related to the functioning of the 
office of the Ombud must be paid from funds appropriated to it by Parliament. The Ombud 
and his or her staff are established as part of the Public Service. 
Questions have, however, been raised regarding the independence and impartiality of the 
Botswana Ombud. In a request which, if accepted, could lead to the model of the Botswana 
Ombud resembling the New Zealand model even more closely, the Botswana Ombud has 
called for his office to be established outside of the Public Service in order to reinforce the 
perception that his office is independent and impartial (Office of the Ombudsman, 2009). The 
Botswana Ombud writes that it is essential that the Office of the Ombud functions 
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independently, impartially and objectively and that these principles must be enunciated in the 
Ombudsman Act (Office of the Ombudsman 2009). 
Parliamentary remarks 
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance found that it would be undesirable for South 
Africa to import provisions which would allow the tax Ombud to have the same power as the 
Public Protector. It must be recalled that the model of the Botswana Ombud provides the 
Ombud with wide reaching powers to carry out his or her investigations which resemble 
those of the South African Public Protector. 
2.5 Country models of a dedicated tax complaints oversight body 
2.5.1 The United Kingdom’s Tax Adjudicator 
The office of the Tax Adjudicator was established to act as an independent reviewer of 
complaints related to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Valuation Office Agency and 
the Insolvency Service (Adjudicator’s Office, 2013).  
Mandate of the UK Tax Adjudicator 
Complaints which fall within the jurisdiction of the Tax Adjudicator generally relate to 
administrative or procedural matters. Examples given on the Tax Adjudicator’s website of 
matters which he or she may investigate include inter alia unreasonable delays in dealing 
with matters, mistakes, poor or misleading advice and inappropriate staff behaviour 
(Adjudicator’s Office, 2014). 
There is an apparent effort to avoid extending the ambit of the Tax Adjudicator’s review 
power too far and restricting it to procedural and administrative complaints only. The Tax 
Adjudicator is precluded from investigating complaints about an ongoing investigation or 
inquiry, matters of government or departmental policy and complaints that have been or are 
being investigated by the Parliamentary Ombud (Adjudicator’s Office, 2014).  
Furthermore, the Tax Adjudicator is prevented from investigating a complaint until the 
complainant has first gone through Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ internal dispute 
resolution procedures (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2011). The Tax Adjudicator’s 
complaints resolution takes the form of non-binding recommendations. Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs is not bound by the recommendations of the Tax Adjudicator, but the 
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revenue collector has contracted to abide by the recommendations of the Tax Adjudicator 
except in rare circumstances (Katz Commission, 1995).    
Appointment of the UK Tax Adjudicator 
The appointment of the Tax Adjudicator is by contract in the form of a service level 
agreement entered into between Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the person 
appointed as Tax Adjudicator. Whilst the appointment of the Tax Adjudicator is made by Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Permanent Secretary for Tax has executive oversight 
over the operations of the Tax Adjudicator’s Office (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 
2011). Certain matters, particularly those related to the funding of the office of the Tax 
Adjudicator, can be escalated to the Permanent Secretary for Tax if there is an impasse 
between the Tax Adjudicator and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.  
Staffing and Funding of the UK Tax Adjudicator 
The Tax Adjudicator’s Office is established as a unit within Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs and must comply with the revenue collector’s policies and guidelines (Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2011). Under the service level agreement, Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs is responsible for supplying the Tax Adjudicator’s Office with the 
staff, accommodation and equipment necessary for the Adjudicator to execute the mandate 
(Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2011). As mentioned above, funding for the office of 
the Tax Adjudicator comes from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs after a budget is 
submitted by the Tax Adjudicator (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2011). Any requests 
for additional funding must also be directed to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.  
Notwithstanding the fact the Tax Adjudicator’s Office is set up as a unit of Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs, the service level agreement expresses a commitment to ensuring that 
the lines of reporting and accountabilities of the Tax Adjudicator to Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs ensure that he or she operates at arm’s length from divisions within the revenue 
collector which the Tax Adjudicator may investigate (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 
2011). The service agreement stipulates that a performance agreement must be created to give 
effect to the arm’s length principle and the independence of the Tax Adjudicator. 
Parliamentary remarks 
One of the South African Parliament’s aims in establishing a tax Ombud was to ensure that 
whatever model was chosen for the creation of the Ombud did not intrude into role of the 
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Public Protector or the Courts (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011).  
Parliament wanted to ensure that the tax Ombud would not have the same powers as the 
Public Protector but would nevertheless function as a step up from the SARS’s own dispute 
resolution processes (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011).   
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance found that the model of the United Kingdom’s 
Tax Adjudicator, if adopted, would ensure that the tax Ombud would not have the same 
powers as the Public Protector (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). However 
it was also found that if adopted, the model of the Tax Adjudicator would give insufficient 
weight to the independence of the tax Ombud from the collector of revenue (Parliament 
Standing Committee on Finance, 2011).  It is submitted that the fact that the Tax Adjudicator 
was established as a unit within Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and relies on the 
revenue authority for funding contributed to Parliament’s findings that the model would not 
safeguard the independence of a South African tax Ombud. 
2.5.2 United States of America’s National Taxpayer’s Advocate  
The Taxpayer’s Ombud was created in 1979 to act as the primary advocate for aggrieved 
taxpayers.  However, in 1996 the function of the Taxpayer’s Ombud was transferred to the 
National Taxpayer’s Advocate (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). Similarly to the 
establishment of the United Kingdom’s Tax Adjudicator, the Taxpayer’s Ombud was 
established as a unit within the revenue collector (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). Concerns 
were raised that the fact that the Taxpayer’s Ombud was selected by, and served at the 
pleasure of the Internal Revenue Service, adversely impacted the independence of the Ombud 
in handling taxpayer’s grievances (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). These concerns 
ultimately led to the function of the Taxpayer’s Ombud being transferred to its successor, the 
National Taxpayer’s Advocate.  
Mandate of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate 
The National Taxpayer’s Advocate has the mandate to assist taxpayers in resolving disputes 
with the Internal Revenue Service (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). The National 
Taxpayer’s Advocate also has the task of identifying problems which taxpayers have in 
dealing with the Internal Revenue Service and to propose changes to the revenue collector’s 
administrative methods to mitigate these problems (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). In 
addition, the National Taxpayer’s Advocate can propose legislative changes which may be 
required to effect the necessary change. 
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Significantly, unlike the United Kingdom’s Taxpayer’s Advocate whose recommendations 
are not binding, the National Taxpayer’s Advocate has the power to issue a binding Taxpayer 
Assistance Order. A Taxpayer’s Assistance Order is an order issued by the National 
Taxpayer’s Advocate to protect a taxpayer who would otherwise suffer substantial harm due 
to the administrative actions of the Internal Revenue Service (Internal Revenue Service, 
2015).  
Taxpayer’s Assistance Orders, once issued, can only be modified or rescinded by the 
National Taxpayer’s Advocate and the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of the 
Internal Revenue Service (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). If rescission or modification of 
the Taxpayer’s Assistance Orders is done by a party other than the National Taxpayer’s 
Advocate, written reasons must be provided explaining why the action was taken. The 
explanation detailing why the Taxpayer’s Assistance Order was rescinded or modified must 
form part of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate report to Congress (Internal Revenue Service, 
2015). 
The National Taxpayer’s Advocate is required to report twice a year to Congress. The first 
report must outline the National Taxpayer’s Advocate’s objectives for the fiscal year and the 
second must outline his or her progress in fulfilling these objectives and other statistical 
information (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).    
Appointment of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate  
The National Taxpayer’s Advocate is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury who must 
do so after consultation with the Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board which has overall 
oversight over the functions of the Internal Revenue Service (Internal Revenue Service 
Oversight Board, 2002).  
Staffing and funding of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate 
The Office of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate is established within the structures of the 
Internal Revenue Service. The staff of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate are appointed 
through the Internal Revenue Service and his or her funding also comes from the budget of 
the Internal Revenue Service (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the staff and funding of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate 
comes from within the Internal Revenue Service, the National Taxpayer’s Advocate was 
established to act, and be perceived to act, independently of the revenue collector (Internal 
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Revenue Service, 2015). So highly regarded is the independence and perception of 
independence of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate that the Local Tax Advocates are 
required, at their first meeting with a complainant, to inform the complainant that they 
operate independently of the Internal Revenue Service and report to directly to Congress 
through the National Taxpayer’s Advocate (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  
Parliamentary remarks 
In its comments on the National Taxpayer’s Advocate, the South African Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Finance remarked that the model of the Taxpayer’s Advocate 
provided a framework for safeguarding the independence of the tax Ombud (Parliament 
Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). It is submitted that this finding may have been 
bolstered by the fact that the National Taxpayer’s Advocate must submit two, independently 
compiled, reports to Congress. The fact that the National Taxpayer’s Advocate reports 
directly to Congress was, however, also found to be disconcerting. Parliament’s Standing 
Committee on Finance found that the role of reporting directly to the legislature, if adopted 
for the South African tax Ombud, would intrude on the function of the Public Protector 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011).   
2.5.3 Model of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud 
Mandate of Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud 
The Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud acts as the Minister of National Revenue’s watchdog over 
the Canada Revenue Agency. The mandate of the Taxpayer’s Ombud is to inform, advise and 
assist the Minister over any matter related to the Canada Revenue Agency’s service delivery 
to taxpayers (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). In performing this mandate the 
Taxpayer’s Ombud has the power to review and address a request for review of a service-
related complaint with the Canada Revenue Agency. The Taxpayer’s Ombud is also 
empowered to proactively identify and review systemic issues within the Canada Revenue 
Agency which might have a negative impact on taxpayers (Office of the Taxpayer’s 
Ombudsman, 2010). 
Review process  
In terms of the establishing Order in Council (at section 6(1)) the Taxpayer’s Ombud must 
review any issue falling within his or her mandate at the request of the Minister of National 
Revenue (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). The Ombud is also empowered to 
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review issues at his or her own behest or on the request of a taxpayer or the taxpayer’s 
representative.  
According to the Order in Council (at section 6(3)), the Taxpayer’s Ombud may refuse to 
grant a request for review of a matter unless if the request has been made by the Minister of 
National Revenue (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). In addition to the discretion 
to refuse to grant a request for a review the Ombud, at section 6(3)(a) and (b) of the Order In 
Council, the Taxpayer’s Ombud may also decide how the review should be undertaken or 
whether or not to discontinue a review.  
The Order in Council (at section 4) sets out the factors which the Taxpayer’s Ombud must 
consider in exercising the discretion to pursue a review and determining the nature of the 
review. These factors are:  
(a) the age of the request or issue; 
(b) the amount of time that has elapsed since the requester became aware of the issue; 
(c) the nature and seriousness of the issue; 
(d) the question of whether the request was made in good faith; and 
(e) the findings of other redress mechanisms with respect to the request. 
  
The Order in Council (at section 7(1)) provides that the Taxpayer’s Ombud may only 
consider a review if the party requesting the review has exhausted all the available remedies 
(Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). On its official website, the office of the 
Taxpayer’s Ombud elaborates on what is meant by the phrase “available remedies”. It states 
that the Taxpayer’s Ombud will typically investigate reviews only after the complainant has 
exhausted the Canada Revenue Agency’s internal complaint resolution mechanisms (Office 
of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2014).  
In terms of the Order in Council (at section 7(1)) the Ombud may review a request even if the 
complainant has not exhausted the internal remedies provided that there are compelling 
reasons justifying a departure from the norm. The Order in Council (at section 7(2)) goes on 
to list the factors which the Taxpayer’s Ombud must consider in deciding whether or not a 
departure from the normal way of initiating a review is justified. These factors are whether or 
not: 
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(a) the request raises systemic issues; 
(b) exhausting the redress mechanisms will cause undue hardship to the requester; or 
(c) exhausting the redress mechanisms is unlikely to produce a result within a period 
of time that the Ombudsman considers reasonable. 
 
The authority of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombudsman to act is limited in a number of ways. 
Notably, the Order in Council (at section 5(2)) precludes the Taxpayer’s Ombud from 
reviewing policy or legislation to the extent that it is not related to service delivery. 
Furthermore, the Taxpayer’s Ombud may not review a matter which is pending before a court 
or which constitutes confidential communication of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. 
The Taxpayer’s Ombud has the power to issue reports and make recommendations on any 
matters under review but the Order in Council (at section 10(3)) makes it explicitly clear that 
the Ombud’s recommendations are not binding (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 
2010).   
Appointment of the Canadian Tax Ombud 
The Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud is appointed by way of a Governor in Council 
appointment. This means that the appointment is made by the Governor General of Canada 
on advice from the Cabinet (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). A Governor in 
Council appointment is made through an Order in Council which sets out the terms and 
conditions of the appointment. The Ombud’s appointment may only be terminated by the 
Governor in Council on good cause (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). 
Appointments which can be done through a Governor in Council appointment range from 
chief executives of government corporations, quasi-judicial appointments to heads of 
government agencies (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). The Canadian 
Taxpayer’s Ombud was appointed in the role of special advisor to the Minister of Revenue. 
According to the Order in Council (at section 9) the Taxpayer’s Ombud is accountable to the 
Minister of National Revenue to whom he or she must submit an annual report (Office of the 
Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). The Ombud does not have the power to report directly to the 
Canadian Parliament, however, the Minister is compelled to table the Taxpayer’s Ombud’s 
annual report before Parliament.  
28 
 
Staffing and Support of Canadian Tax Ombud 
Staffing and support for the work of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud comes from the 
Canada Revenue Agency. In terms of the Order in Council (at section 3), the staff of the 
office of the Taxpayer’s Ombud are appointed in terms of the Canada Revenue Agency Act 
(S.C. 1999, c.17) and constitute part of the Agency (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 
2010).  
In spite of the apparent closeness between the staffing of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud 
and the Canada Revenue Agency, the Ombud asserts that it operates at arm’s length from the 
Canada Revenue Agency (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2014b). In its statement of 
principles the office of the Taxpayer’s Ombud states that it neither acts as an “advocate for 
taxpayers, nor defender of the Canada Revenue Agency” (Office of the Taxpayer’s 
Ombudsman 2014b). Instead, the Taxpayer’s Ombud purports to be an impartial and fair 
party who considers the perspectives of both the Canada Revenue Agency and the taxpayer in 
the interests of equity and justice (Office of the taxpayer’s Ombudsman 2014b).   
Parliamentary Remarks 
The model for the establishment of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud received the most 
positive review of the Parliamentary review committee on the various types of possible 
models. Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance concluded that the model of the 
Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud, if adopted in South Africa, would provide for the 
independence of the Tax Ombud and also not intrude on the role of the Public Protector or 
the Courts (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance 2011).  
So convinced was the South African legislature of the efficacy of the Canadian Taxpayer’s 
Ombud model that it expressed the wish that in time, the South African tax Ombud would 
more closely resemble the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud (Parliament Standing Committee on 
Finance, 2011). It is unsurprising therefore that Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance 
recommended that a hybrid of the UK Tax Adjudicators model, and more predominantly, the 
Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud model be adopted for establishing a South African tax Ombud. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In deciding on a South African tax Ombud, the South African Parliament considered two 
types of models. Complaint handling models which did not have a dedicated tax complaint 
oversight body were generally viewed as unsuitable for adoption in the South African 
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context. These models typically established a review body, in the form of an Ombud, 
responsible for reviewing complaints related to the administration of government departments 
and public bodies in general. Complaints related specifically to the tax authority would, as a 
consequence of the wide mandate of the review body, fall to be dealt with by this single 
oversight body which would sometimes consist of sub-agents or deputy Ombuds. The South 
African legislature took the view that the Constitution already provided a watchdog 
responsible for monitoring the functions of State departments and public bodies in the form 
of the Public Protector.  
The South African legislature was at pains to ensure that whatever model was adopted for the 
tax Ombud, would not usurp the power of the Public Protector. The Swedish Ombud, 
Botswana Ombud and New Zealand Ombuds all have the power to directly report to 
Parliament on their activities. South African lawmakers felt that a model which gave the tax 
Ombud the power to report directly to Parliament would intrude on the role of the Public 
Protector as the ultimate watchdog of taxpayer’s, and indeed all citizens’ rights.  
Parliament felt that its goal of establishing the tax Ombud between the Public Protector and 
SARS would be best achieved by adopting a model which established an oversight body 
dedicated solely to reviewing taxpayer’s complaints.  South African lawmakers wanted to 
establish an Ombud who would neither have the Public Protector’s substantial powers nor his 
or her extensive mandate, but still operate as an effective handler of SARS’s administrative 
deficiencies. In order to achieve this, Parliament found it critical that the Ombud should be 
established as an independent and impartial institution. 
Various versions of such a model were available for Parliament’s consideration. Ultimately, 
Parliament settled on the Canadian model of the Taxpayer’s Ombud, with some aspects of the 
UK Tax Adjudicator model as the most suitable for South Africa’s dispensation. 
The following chapter will detail which aspects of the various models considered by 
Parliament were eventually incorporated into the model of the South African tax Ombud. The 
various concerns raised by academics and experts on the suitability of the eventual model 
adopted for a South African tax Ombud will also be discussed.  
The recent decision by Australian lawmakers to move the tax complaint oversight functions 
of the Commonwealth Ombud to the Inspector General of Taxes offers a new model of a 
dedicated tax complaint review body which Parliament did not get to consider.  This model of 
the Inspector General of Taxes will be analysed against the model of the South African tax 
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Ombud. The aim of this analysis will be to determine if any lessons can be learnt from the 
Australian model which could go some way in addressing the concerns of critics.   
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Chapter 3: Model of the South African tax Ombud 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will address the second goal of this thesis, which is to compare the various 
models considered by the South African Parliament in developing a tax Ombud. The aim of 
this chapter will be to determine which elements of the different models discussed in chapter 
2 were eventually incorporated into the South African model of the tax Ombud. Such an 
investigation will build on to the understanding of the underlying reasoning and principles 
which informed the selection of the model of the South African tax Ombud. 
Concerns raised by experts and critics about the manner in which the operations of the tax 
Ombud have been provided for will also be discussed. It will be investigated whether or not 
any of the models of dedicated taxpayer complaints oversight bodies offer ideas or solutions 
which can contribute to addressing the concerns of critics.   
3.2 The Tax Administration Act 
The South African tax Ombud was established within the framework of the Tax 
Administration Act, 28 of 2011. The purpose of this Act was to align the various 
administrative provisions of the various tax Acts into one piece of legislation (SARS, 2009). 
Some of these provisions had been duplicated in the different tax legislation and the 
duplicated provisions included those provisions related to appeal and objection procedures. 
Among its purported objects, the Tax Administration Act seeks to balance the rights and 
obligations of taxpayers against those of SARS (SARS, 2009). It is also professed that the 
drafters of the Tax Administration Act were mindful of the overarching supremacy of the 
Constitution and the immutable rights which it bestows on all citizens, including taxpayers. 
International experts, constitutional experts and comparative reviews of administration laws 
in other countries informed the drafting of this legislation (SARS, 2009).The provisions 
relating to the establishment and functioning of the tax Ombud are contained in sections 14 to 
21 of the Tax Administration Act. 
3.3 Model of the South African tax Ombud 
Mandate of the South African tax Ombud 
Section 16 (1) of the Tax Administration Act makes it explicit that the tax Ombud is a 
dedicated oversight body solely concerned with addressing and reviewing complaints related 
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to SARS. This section provides that the mandate of the tax Ombud is to review and address 
any complaint by a taxpayer regarding a service matter or a procedural or administrative 
matter arising from the application of the provisions of a tax Act by SARS. 
The South African tax Ombud can only conduct a review of the conduct of SARS to the 
extent that the review or investigation is related to administrative and procedural matters. In 
terms of section 17(a) of the Tax Administration Act, the tax Ombud is precluded from 
reviewing legislation or tax policy. The tax Ombud may also not review a matter that is 
already under consideration under an objection or appeal procedure established in a tax Act. 
In terms of the Tax Administration Act (at section 17(c)) the tax Ombud may not conduct a 
review of such a matter except to the extent that the review is related to a procedural or 
administrative issue. The tax Ombud is also restricted from reviewing decisions of the tax 
court or a matter that is before the tax court. 
There is a distinction between those matters which fall into the tax Ombud’s mandate and 
those which he or she cannot investigate. Generally speaking, administrative complaints 
related to SARS fall to be dealt with by the tax Ombud whilst non-procedural and non-
administrative disputes are dealt with in terms of separate dispute resolution procedures. For 
instance, in terms of the Ministerial rules governing the lodging of an objection or appeal 
against an assessment of SARS, objections against assessments must be directed first to 
SARS with the option of escalating the matter to the tax board or tax court (Government 
Gazette, 2014). 
It must be noted, however, that the function of reviewing administrative complaints regarding 
SARS is not an exclusive function reserved for the tax Ombud as SARS has its own internal 
corrective procedures. In terms of the Tax Administration Act (at section 18(4)), the tax 
Ombud can only review an administrative complaint if the complainant has exhausted the 
internal remedies available within SARS, unless there are compelling reasons for not doing 
so. In keeping with this provision, the current tax Ombud encourages taxpayers to try to first 
resolve any disputes with SARS before complaining to his office (Office of the tax Ombud, 
2015).  
In the same notice which advises taxpayers to first exhaust the internal remedies of SARS, 
the tax Ombud also advises that if a taxpayer is unsatisfied after exhausting the SARS’s 
internal remedies, the issue can be escalated to his office (Office of the tax Ombud, 2015). 
There is an underlying expectation that a taxpayer’s complaint will be resolved by either the 
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internal mechanisms available from SARS or the tax Ombud. In the event that both dispute 
resolution avenues fail, a taxpayer is entitled to follow the more protracted process of seeking 
recourse from the Public Protector (Office of the tax Ombud, 2015). 
The South African Minister of Finance reported to Parliament in his annual report that since 
its establishment in 2013, the Office of the tax Ombud has attended to over 6000 contacts 
with clients and more than 1200 complaints (National Treasury, 2015). Since the appointment 
of retired Judge President Bernard Ngoepe as the first tax Ombud in 2013, examples have 
started to emerge of the nature of administrative or procedural disputes which can be brought 
to the attention of the tax Ombud.  
Section 19(1)(a) of the Tax Administration Act provides that the tax Ombud must report 
directly to the Minister of Finance. This section imposes a duty on the tax Ombud to submit 
an annual report to the Minister of Finance and also submit reports to the Commissioner of 
SARS, but in the latter case, the time frame for submitting the report can be varied. In terms 
of section 19(2)(a) the reports must contain a summary of ten of the most serious issues 
encountered by taxpayers and systematic and emerging issues identified by the tax Ombud in 
the administrative conduct of SARS. These issues must be documented in the tax Ombud’s 
report to the Minister of Finance.  The Minister has an obligation to table the report before 
the National Assembly in terms of section 19(3) of the Tax Administration Act.  
In his second annual report to the Minister of Finance, the South African tax Ombud 
summarised the nature of issues and complaints which taxpayers bring to his office (Office of 
the tax Ombud, 2015b). One case in the tax Ombud’s inventory of complaints involves SARS 
failing to release a taxpayer’s Value-Added Tax refund. SARS had also not written to the 
taxpayer to inform him why his refund was taking longer to be released than the stipulated 
twenty one days (Office of the tax Ombud, 2015b). The matter was brought to the attention of 
the tax Ombud and after his intervention, SARS investigated the delay and the taxpayer 
received his refund. Another example is of SARS repeatedly making refund payments into 
the wrong bank account. The tax Ombud requested SARS to investigate the matter and 
recommended that SARS put a hold on making payments of outstanding refunds when 
requested to change a taxpayer’s banking details (Office of the tax Ombud, 2015b). The 
taxpayer’s banking details were subsequently updated by SARS and payment of the refund 
was made. It is submitted that disputes involving delays in processing of payments by SARS, 
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administrative mistakes and unsatisfactory service delivery by the revenue collector appear to 
be the ideal grievances for taxpayers to bring to the Ombud’s attention. 
It is submitted that in prescribing a mandate for the tax Ombud, South African lawmakers 
made use of ideas from similarly positioned tax-specific oversight institutions in other 
countries, as discussed in chapter 2. For instance, the fact that the South African tax Ombud 
is empowered to review just administrative and procedural complaints is consistent with these 
other models of tax-specific oversight institutions. The mandate of the UK Tax Adjudicator is 
also limited to investigating and reviewing complaints which relate to administrative and 
procedural matters of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Adjudicator’s Office, 2014).  
In terms of section 19(2)(c) of the Tax Administration Act, the South African tax Ombud 
must provide recommendations on how to resolve the problems encountered by taxpayers. 
Similarly, the United States of America’s Taxpayer’s Advocate’s mandate includes proposing 
changes to the administrative methods of the Internal Revenue Service (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2015). Lastly, the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud, on whom the model of the South 
African tax Ombud was largely based, also only reviews service-related issues regarding the 
Canada Revenue Agency (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). 
It is submitted that excluding certain disputes from the ambit of the tax Ombud is consistent 
with the stated objectives of the legislature in developing the model of a tax Ombud. It must 
be recalled that the South African Parliament intended to establish the tax Ombud in a 
position mid-way between the Public Protector, who is the ultimate watchdog of taxpayer’s 
rights, and the SARS’s own internal dispute resolution mechanisms (Parliament Standing 
Committee on Finance, 2011). By reserving the escalation of tax assessment disputes for the 
tax board and tax court, and the escalation of administrative disputes for the tax Ombud, the 
legislature, it is submitted, creates an identifiable role for the tax Ombud in the overall tax 
dispute resolution framework.   
Powers of Review of the South African tax Ombud 
It has been discussed how the model of a South African tax Ombud was largely based on the 
model of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud. It is submitted that nowhere is this point more 
evident than in the provisions which regulate the South African tax Ombud’s powers of 
review.  
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Sections 18(2)(a) and (b) of the Tax Administration Act provide for the manner in which the 
tax Ombud must go about addressing complaints brought to his office. In terms of these 
provisions, upon receipt of a complaint, the tax Ombud has the power to determine whether 
or not a review should be conducted, he may also determine the manner in which the review 
process will be conducted and, lastly, whether or not the review should be terminated before 
its completion. 
After completion of the review, the Tax Administration Act (at section 18(6)), requires the 
tax Ombud to inform the aggrieved taxpayer of the results of the review or any action taken 
in respect of the complaint, but in the manner and time chosen by the Ombud. It is submitted 
that the Tax Administration Act grants the tax Ombud the discretion to decide on whether or 
not to act, and the manner in which he or she should act, on several aspects involving the 
execution of his or her mandate. 
Not only does the discretion of the South African tax Ombud match that of the Canadian 
Taxpayer’s Ombud, but so do the factors which the Ombud must consider before exercising 
this discretion. Section 18(3) of the Tax Administration Act prescribes which factors must be 
considered by the tax Ombud in deciding how to proceed after the receipt of a complaint. 
These factors are: 
(a) the age of the request or issue; 
(b) the amount of time that has elapsed since the requester became aware of the issue; 
(c) the nature and seriousness of the issue; 
(d) the question of whether the request was made in good faith; and 
(e) the findings of other redress mechanisms with respect to the request. 
Upon close examination, it becomes apparent that South African lawmakers essentially 
“copied and pasted” factors relating to the exercise of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud’s 
discretion into the Tax Administration Act (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). 
In addition, as mentioned above, the South African tax Ombud generally initiates an 
investigation into a complaint only after the complainant has exhausted internal remedies 
available from SARS (Office of the tax Ombud, 2015). There is, however, an exception. If 
there are compelling circumstances justifying why the complainant did not use SARS’s 
internal remedies the tax Ombud may go straight into a review of a complaint. This general 
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rule, and accompanying exception, mirrors the model of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud. 
Section 18(5) provides for a number of factors to assist the tax Ombud in determining 
whether or not there are compelling circumstances justifying a departure from SARS internal 
processes. Once again, these factors were copied verbatim from the Canadian Taxpayer’s 
Ombud’s establishing Order in Council (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010).  
The similarities between the model of the South African tax Ombud and that of the Canadian 
Taxpayer’s Ombud extend beyond the review process as there are other provisions which are 
almost identical. For example, the South African tax Ombud must inform the complainant, 
described in the Tax Administration Act (at section 18(6)) as the “requester of results”, of any 
action taken in response to a request. Similar provisions can be found in the Canadian Order 
in Council (at section 8) where the complainant is also curiously referred to as the “requester 
of results” (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). 
Section 16(2)(c) of the Tax Administration Act places a duty on the South African tax 
Ombud to resolve disputes in a cost effective, informal and fair manner. Section 20(1) of the 
same Act requires the Ombud to resolve disputes at the level where they will be most 
efficiently and effectively resolved. The tax Ombud resolves disputes through 
recommendations, but the Tax Administration Act (at section 20(2)) makes it explicit that the 
Ombud’s recommendations are not binding on SARS or the taxpayer. It is submitted that the 
fact that the Canadian taxpayer’s Ombud’s recommendations are also not binding is further 
evidence of South African lawmakers’ attempt to model the South African tax Ombud along 
the lines of the Canadian taxpayer’s Ombud (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010).     
Appointment of the South African tax Ombud 
In keeping with most of the tax-specific oversight models considered by the South African 
Parliament in developing a model for a tax Ombud, the appointment of the South African tax 
Ombud is made by a government official. In terms of section 14(1) of the Tax Administration 
Act, the appointment of the South African tax Ombud is the sole prerogative of the Minister 
of Finance. The South African National Assembly does not play a role in deciding who is 
appointed as the tax Ombud.  
Similarly, the appointment of the United States of America’s National Taxpayer’s Advocate 
is made by the Secretary of Treasury (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). The only condition 
which applies to the appointment of the National Taxpayer’s Advocate is that it must be done 
in consultation with the Internal Revenue Service’s Oversight Board (Internal Revenue 
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Service Oversight Board, 2002). The Canadian House of Commons is also not involved in the 
appointment of that country’s Taxpayer’s Ombud. Instead, the appointment of the Canadian 
Taxpayer’s Ombud is done by the Governor General on the advice of Cabinet (Office of the 
Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010). 
Of the models discussed, the only model of a dedicated taxpayer complaints oversight body 
which does not place the power of appointing the complaints handler in a government 
official, is the model of the UK Tax Adjudicator. In the UK, the appointment of the Tax 
Adjudicator is the prerogative of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs, 2011). However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Permanent 
Secretary for Tax, whilst not involved in his or her appointment, enjoys executive oversight 
over the functions of the UK Tax Adjudicator (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2011). 
It becomes apparent, after comparing the manner of appointment in models of countries 
without tax-specific oversight bodies with those that have them, that in the latter, the 
legislature is not involved in the appointment, whilst in the former, the legislature plays an 
intrinsic role in who gets appointed. For instance, in the case of the Swedish Ombud, he or 
she is appointed by a secret ballot in the Swedish Riksdag and in the case of the New Zealand 
Ombud, he or she is appointed by the Governor General based on recommendations from the 
House of Representatives.  
It is submitted that the difference in the appointment of the different types of oversight bodies 
referred to can be explained by the substantial differences in the mandates and nature of 
power of the respective oversight bodies. As discussed in chapter 2, those oversight 
institutions which function in jurisdictions without tax-specific complaints oversight bodies 
generally have a wide mandate which covers a wide range of government departments. These 
non-specific oversight bodies also generally have wide-reaching discretionary powers in the 
manner in which they conduct investigations and in their power to report directly to 
Parliament. Tax specific oversight bodies, on the other hand, have a limited mandate 
restricted to just tax disputes. Their powers of review and investigation are not as far reaching 
or as discretionary as those of non-specific oversight institutions. These differences in power 
and mandate, it is submitted, may motivate why greater involvement is required from the 
legislature in the appointment of non-specific general oversight institutions than is required 
for tax-specific complaint review bodies. 
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According to section 14(1)(a) of the Tax Administration Act, the South African tax Ombud 
must be appointed by the Minister of Finance for a renewable period of three years. The 
Minister also has the power to determine conditions regarding the remuneration and 
allowances of the tax Ombud. Furthermore, the tax Ombud is accountable to the Minister 
who, in terms of section 14(2) of the Tax Administration Act, may dismiss a tax Ombud on 
three specified grounds. A South African tax Ombud may be dismissed by the Minister of 
Finance on the grounds of misconduct, incompetency or incapacity. 
In the event that the South African tax Ombud’s recommendations are not acted upon, the 
most he or she can do is report the inaction to the Minister of Finance, who is also 
responsible for his or her appointment. It is submitted that the fact that the tax Ombud can 
only go as far as the Minister of Finance in the event that his or her recommendations are not 
acted upon, is indicative of the fact that the Ombud is subordinate to the Minister. Though not 
explicitly stated in the establishing legislation, it is submitted that the South African tax 
Ombud occupies a similar role to that of his Canadian counterpart in relation to the Minister 
of Finance: the role of advisor.  
Staffing of the South African tax Ombud 
In terms of section 15(1) of the Tax Administration Act, the staff of the tax Ombud must be 
employed in terms of the SARS Act, 34 of 1997. In terms of section 18(1) of the SARS Act, 
SARS must determine the terms and conditions of persons employed in terms of the Act. It 
follows therefore that staff appointed to work in the office of the tax Ombud have their terms 
and conditions of employment determined by SARS. The staff of the tax Ombud comes from 
within SARS and the Tax Administration Act (at section 15(1)) provides that staff must be 
seconded from SARS to the tax Ombud at the request of the Ombud and in consultation with 
the Commissioner for SARS.  
The manner in which the staffing of the South African tax Ombud is provided for mirrors the 
position in the three countries whose dedicated tax complaints oversight bodies were 
considered by the South African Parliament. The UK Tax Adjudicator was established as a 
unit of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and naturally, the revenue collector is 
responsible for providing the Tax Adjudicator with the staff and equipment necessary for the 
performance of his or her mandate (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2011). The United 
States of America’s National Taxpayer’s Advocate operates within the structures of the 
Internal Revenue Service and his or her staff are appointed through the revenue collector 
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(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). The case of the Canadian Taxpayers 
Ombud, which was an influential source of reference for South African lawmakers, is no 
different to the National Taxpayer’s Advocate and the Tax Adjudicator. The staff of the 
Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud are appointed in terms of the Canada Revenue Agency Act and 
constitute a part of that Agency (Office of the Taxpayer’s Ombudsman, 2010).  
It is submitted that the South African Parliament, in deciding on how a South African tax 
Ombud would be staffed, followed the example set by the international models it analysed, 
especially the Canadian example.   
Funding of the South African tax Ombud 
Section 15(4) of the Tax Administration Act provides that expenditure incurred by the tax 
Ombud in discharging his or her mandate must be borne out of the funds of SARS. Once 
again, the nature of the funding provisions of the South African tax Ombud seem to have 
been strongly influenced by similar provisions in tax complaints oversight models which 
formed the basis of Parliament’s deliberations.  
Funding for the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud comes from the Canada Revenue Agency and 
similar arrangements are in place for the United States National Taxpayer’s Advocate who 
receives funding and support from the Internal Revenue Service. The UK Tax Adjudicator 
also receives funding from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs for the execution of his or 
her mandate after submitting a budget to the revenue collector (Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs, 2011). 
As they did with the provisions relating to the staffing of the South African tax Ombud, 
South African lawmakers followed the lead of overseas models of dedicated tax complaints 
oversight bodies which had been established and were functioning at the time.  
3.4 Criticism of the model of the South African tax Ombud 
It has been shown how the provisions of the model of the South African tax Ombud were 
largely influenced by foreign models of similarly tasked oversight bodies. Indeed, the model 
established by Parliament appears to be in keeping with the general outline of the models that 
were considered at the time of Parliament’s deliberations. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
model of the South African tax Ombud, to a greater extent, conformed to the international 
trend that prevailed at the time of its crafting, criticism has been directed at some of the 
provisions which establish the office of the Ombud in the Tax Administration Act. 
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In its report on public stakeholder responses to the establishment of the Tax Administration 
Bill, the Standing Committee on Finance reported that the introduction of the tax Ombud into 
the tax framework had been generally well received (Parliament Standing Committee on 
Finance, 2011b). Comments on the Tax Administration Bill were received from legal experts, 
professionals and academics. These included the Law Society of South Africa, the South 
African Institute of Tax Practitioners and Professor Michael Katz, who chaired the Katz 
Commission which initiated the idea of a tax Ombud for South Africa (Parliament Standing 
Committee on Finance, 2011b). 
Accompanying the general warm reception to the introduction of the tax Ombud, some 
criticism was also levied against the manner in which the Tax Administration Act provides 
for the establishment of the Ombud. It was argued that instead of creating the Office of the 
tax Ombud within the statutory framework of the Tax Administration Act, the Ombud should 
rather have been established in terms of a separate Act of Parliament to safeguard his or her 
independence (Ofori-Boateng, 2014).  
In terms of section 14(1)(a) of the Tax Administration Act, the Minister of Finance has the 
power to appoint a tax Ombud for a renewable term of three years. Under section 14(2) of the 
same Act the Minister is also vested with the power to dismiss the Ombud, but he may only 
do so on the grounds of incompetence, incapacity or misconduct. Section 14(5)(a) also makes 
it expressly clear that the tax Ombud is accountable to the Minister.  
In its report on stakeholder responses to the Tax Administration Bill, the Standing Committee 
on Finance reported that some stakeholders held the view that the tax Ombud should be 
accountable to Parliament and not the Minister of Finance (Parliament Standing Committee 
on Finance, 2011b). This sentiment is also shared by some tax experts who contend that the 
tax Ombud should be accountable to Parliament for greater independence (Klue, in du Preez, 
2011). It has also been put forward that in order to safeguard the impartiality of the tax 
Ombud, the power to appoint and dismiss him or her should have been vested in a legislative 
body and not the Minister (Ofori-Boateng, 2014).  
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance responded to the view that the appointment of 
the tax Ombud should be removed from the hands of the Minister by asserting that the fact 
that the Minister of Finance appoints the tax Ombud does not diminish the latter’s 
independence from SARS (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011b). It was also 
stated that if the Ombud was given the power to report directly to Parliament, it would 
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intrude on the role of the Public Protector (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 
2011b). It was recommended that the tax Ombud must be required to report annually to the 
Minister and this annual report would form part of the Minister’s annual report to Parliament 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011b). It was averred that, if adopted, 
reporting to the Minister of Finance and not Parliament would bring the model of the South 
African tax Ombud closer to the highly regarded model of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud.   
Other aspects providing for the establishment and operations of the South African tax Ombud 
have also drawn disapproval. Section 15(1) of the Tax Administration Act provides that the 
staff of the tax Ombud must be appointed in terms of the SARS Act. Section 15(4) goes on to 
provide that expenditure incurred in the execution of the Ombud’s mandate must be paid 
from the funds of SARS.  
Responses received by Parliament’s Committee on Finance indicated that some stakeholders 
believed that if the staffing and funding of the tax Ombud came out of SARS, the Ombud 
would not be able to act independently from SARS (Parliament Standing Committee on 
Finance, 2011b). Professor Mollagee agrees with this sentiment and argues that the tax 
Ombud will never be truly independent if its costs are paid, and staff are employed by SARS 
(Mollagee, in du Preez, 2011).  
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance responded to the criticism of the tax Ombud’s 
funding and staffing provisions by insisting that the fact that the tax Ombud is funded and 
staffed by SARS is a matter of practicality (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 
2011b). It was asserted further that sourcing the Ombud’s funding and staffing out of SARS 
would ease the administration of his or her operations, ensuring that the Ombud’s staff are 
well versed with SARS internal processes and systems. The Standing Committee on Finance 
bolstered its claims by stating that tax-specific oversight bodies in the UK, United States of 
America and Canada are all funded through the revenue collection agencies they review for 
these reasons.   
3.5 Independence and Partiality of the South African tax Ombud 
Independence and partiality are two aspirations which are central to the operations of all the 
tax specific oversight institutions discussed in chapter 2. Each institution, either through its 
establishing documents or public communications, stresses that it operates as an oversight 
body which is independent of the revenue authority which it monitors. As illustrated in 
chapter 2, the UK Tax Adjudicator expresses this commitment in the service level agreement 
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with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2011). 
Local Taxpayer’s Advocates, who act as functionaries of the American National Taxpayer’s 
Advocate, inform clients in their first meeting that they function independently of the Internal 
Revenue Service and report to Congress (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). In its statement of 
principles, the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud asserts that her office is a neutral monitor that 
weighs both sides of a dispute in the pursuit of fairness and equity (Office of the Taxpayer’s 
Ombudsman, 2014b). 
Reservations expressed by academics and experts over the ability of the tax Ombud to 
operate independently and impartially from SARS cast doubt over whether or not the 
aspirations of Parliament were realised. Establishing the Office of the tax Ombud as an 
independent and impartial body was of significant importance to the legislature. This point is 
illustrated by the duties imposed on the Ombud by Parliament. In terms of section 16(2) of 
the Tax Administration Act, the tax Ombud must ensure that certain standards of conduct are 
upheld in the discharge of his or her mandate. Section 16(2)(b) places an obligation on the 
Ombud to ensure that he or she acts independently in resolving a complaint. Additionally, in 
terms of section 16(2)(c) of the Tax Administration Act, the tax Ombud must resolve a 
dispute using informal and cost effective procedures whilst ensuring that these procedures are 
also fair.  
The Tax Administration Act (at section 16(2)(d)) imposes an additional duty on the tax 
Ombud to disseminate information to taxpayers about the mandate of his or her office and the 
manner in which a complaint can be brought to his or her attention. The current tax Ombud 
has been at pains to communicate to the media and on his official website that his office 
operates independently from SARS. In his welcome note on their website, the tax Ombud 
asserts that the mandate of his office is to provide a “simple and impartial” channel to dispute 
resolution with SARS (Office of the tax Ombud, 2015). The tax Ombud also expressly 
acknowledges being bound by the public administration provisions in Chapter 10 of the 
Constitution. Specifically, the Tax Ombud makes reference to section 195(1)(d) of the 
Constitution which dictates that public administrative services must be provided impartially 
and without bias. 
The current Ombud has also been reported in the media as asserting the independence and 
impartiality of his office from SARS. The tax Ombud has stated that his office is independent 
of SARS and executes its functions impartially (Mudzuli, 2015). The tax Ombud has also 
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used the physical distance between his office and SARS to further distance his office from 
any undue influence from SARS by stating that the two institutions are “miles apart” 
(Mudzuli, 2015). 
It is submitted that there is evidence of a disparity between, on the one hand, the aspirations 
of Parliament through the Tax Administration Act, and those of the tax Ombud, to create a 
truly independent and impartial body capable of reviewing and addressing the SARS 
administrative shortcomings, and on the other hand, concern from some academics and 
experts that the manner in which the tax Ombud has been established renders the aspirations 
of independence and impartiality impossible to realise.  
It is important to note that doubts raised by critics on the ability of the tax Ombud to operate 
independently and impartially do not relate to the person of the Ombud, but rather to the 
provisions of the Tax Administration Act which establish his office. Provisions of the Tax 
Administration Act relating to how the tax Ombud must be appointed, staffed and funded 
have raised queries on whether or not the Ombud will be able to operate independently from 
SARS and execute its mandate impartially. 
It must also be noted that criticism on the appearance of a lack of independence of the tax 
Ombud from SARS is not the only area of concern which has drawn the ire of critics. 
Concern has also been raised on the provisions of section 20(2) of the Tax Administration 
Act which provide that the recommendations of the Ombud are non-binding on SARS and the 
taxpayer.  
Comments received by Parliament’s Standing Committee on Finance indicate that some 
stakeholders wanted the tax Ombud to have some determinative authority over SARS 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011b). In a manner which would mimic the 
American National Taxpayer’s Advocate’s Taxpayer’s Assistance Orders, the critics called 
for the tax Ombud to have the power to compel SARS to act. Parliament responded to the 
comments by asserting that none of the other tax-specific oversight bodies considered had 
final determinative powers as their decisions were either non-binding or could be overruled 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011b). The South African Parliament preferred 
the Canadian Taxpayer’s Ombud’s methods of moral suasion and publicity instead 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011b). 
It is submitted that there is substance to the concerns raised by critics over the South African 
tax Ombud’s non-binding recommendations which warrants some consideration. For 
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instance, the question is raised of how much publicity the Ombud actually has access to, 
when he or she is denied the right to appear before Parliament. An investigation into the 
issues behind such questions falls outside of the scope of this thesis but it is recommended 
that this provides a potential area for future investigation. 
3.6 The Concept of Institutional Bias 
The term bias is synonymous with partiality and prejudice, which results in the favouring of 
one person or group of persons over another. The Cambridge English Dictionary defines bias, 
when used in relation to a person, as the act of allowing personal judgements and opinions to 
influence whether one is opposed to, or in support of, a particular cause or thing in an unfair 
way (Cambridge Dictionary Online, 2015). Examples of this kind of personal bias include 
bias in interview processes, where an individual is chosen to receive a benefit at the expense 
of others due to the selector’s subjective judgement instead of objective decision aids (OPP 
Limited, 2013).   
It must however be recalled that criticism of the adopted model of the South African tax 
Ombud does not allege that the tax Ombud is personally biased in favour of SARS, but rather 
that the provisions relating to the staffing, funding and appointment of the tax Ombud render 
the institution of the Ombud are inherently biased in favour of SARS.  
Institutional bias is defined as unfairly discriminatory practices which occur at an institutional 
level caused by mechanisms which go beyond individual prejudice (Henry, 2010). These 
mechanisms can be established laws, customs and practices which systematically produce 
inequality (Henry, 2010). Laws which regulate how an institution must operate such as, for 
example, the Tax Administration Act, have the potential to create standards of practice in the 
institutions they regulate which results in differential outcomes for one group or groups 
(Henry, 2010). A key feature of institutional bias is that an institution may be biased 
regardless of whether or not the members of the institution have biased intentions.  
An analysis of the criticism of the model of the South African tax Ombud reveals that 
disapproval of the model is related to the establishing provisions governing the appointment, 
staffing and funding of the tax Ombud. The concern is that these establishing provisions 
could result in institutional bias in favour of SARS in the manner in which the tax Ombud 
handles taxpayer’s complaints.  
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Institutional bias can also be understood in a public administrative sense. In most modern 
states, the state is constantly seeking to increase its influence in more facets of their citizens’ 
lives (Jones, 1977). Typically, this is done through Parliament using its legislative powers to 
delegate some of the state’s discretionary powers (Jones, 1977). An example of this would be 
the establishment of SARS by Parliament through the SARS Act to manage the efficient and 
effective collection of revenue for the Republic. The state’s discretionary power to collect 
taxes from its citizens was, in a sense, delegated to SARS. 
In order to ensure that these delegates use their powers fairly, states will frequently establish 
appeal procedures through which administrative decisions of the state delegates can be 
appealed by members of the public (Jones, 1977). These administrative appeal processes are 
also normally established outside of the normal court processes (Jones, 1977). It is submitted 
that the reason for positioning the appeal procedures outside of normal court processes could 
be to facilitate ease of access to these institutions to the public by avoiding the high costs 
associated with litigation.  
A problem arises, however, when the membership of the original decision maker overlaps 
with the composition of the appeal or review body, giving rise to the phenomenon of 
institutional bias (Jones, 1977). The concept of institutional bias, explained in this way, 
embodies the concerns of critics of the model of the South African tax Ombud, particularly in 
relation to the manner in which the Ombud is staffed and supported. There is an apprehension 
that the power of the tax Ombud to review and investigate the administrative decisions of 
SARS will not be exercised impartially as long as the tax Ombud is staffed and supported 
through SARS. 
3.7 The Australian Inspector General of Taxation 
As discussed above, the drafters of the model of the South African tax Ombud based their 
model on other models of tax complaints oversight bodies which they analysed and 
compared. The Canadian model of the Taxpayer’s Ombud was seen by the South African 
legislature as the ideal model for South Africa to follow (Parliament Standing Committee on 
Finance, 2011). Of the six countries whose models were considered by Parliament, one was 
deliberately left out of the analysis in chapter 2.  
The Australian administrative tax complaint resolution framework was not discussed because 
the Australian legislative tax framework has undergone a recent change. When the South 
African Parliament considered the Australian model of a tax complaint handler, Australia did 
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not have a dedicated tax complaint oversight body (Parliament Standing Committee on 
Finance, 2011). Instead, tax complaints were dealt with by a broad, non-specific public 
administrative complaints handler. This broad complaints handler was the Commonwealth 
Ombud and was in many respects similar to the New Zealand and Botswana Ombuds 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011). 
The Commonwealth Ombud was established in terms of the Ombudsman Act, 181 of 1976. 
The Commonwealth Ombud’s mandate is not limited to areas within the borders of Australia 
but also extends to the Australian external territories. In terms of section 5(1)(a) of the 
Ombudsman Act, the mandate of the Commonwealth Ombud is to investigate matters that 
relate to administration where a complaint has been made to his or her office. At section 
5(1)(b) of the Ombudsman Act the Commonwealth Ombud is also empowered to take the 
initiative and investigate matters of an administrative nature where no complaint has been 
made. 
Previously, The Ombudsman Act provided for the Commonwealth Ombud to investigate 
complaints related to maladministration in the Australian Taxation Office. The Ombudsman 
Act (at section 4(3)) provided for the Commonwealth Ombud to be referred to as the taxation 
Ombud when investigating the Australian Taxation Office. Until the first day of May 2015, 
the Commonwealth or taxation Ombud was responsible for dealing with complaints related to 
the administration of the Australian Taxation Office. Since then the function has been 
transferred to the Inspector General of Taxation. 
The transfer of the functions of the taxation Ombud to the Inspector General of Taxation was 
motivated by criticism of the effectiveness of the Australian Taxation Office’s complaints 
handling procedures. In 2012, the Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts and Auditing published a report on Australia’s tax system. The report found that 
the taxation Ombud was receiving a record number of consumer complaints (Parliament of 
Australia, 2012). The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Auditing found that the 
increase in complaints to the taxation Ombud’s office corresponded with a decrease in the 
number of complaints to the Australian Taxation Office (Parliament of Australia, 2012). It 
was noted by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Auditing that complainants were 
approaching the taxation Ombud directly without first exhausting the remedies available from 
the Australian Taxation Office as required (Parliament of Australia, 2012). 
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In his submissions to the tax forum, the then Australian Inspector General of Taxation 
proposed that a single body be created to handle consumer complaints about the Australian 
Tax Office. The Inspector General of Taxation submitted that a single monitoring body 
committed to investigating and addressing consumers’ complaints would create a single port 
of call for consumers with grievances (Inspector General of Taxation, 2011). He also 
submitted that a single monitoring body would allow for problems in the administration of 
the Australian Tax Office to be resolved before they became systemic (Inspector General of 
Taxation, 2011). The recommendations of the Inspector General of Taxation were accepted 
by Australian lawmakers, leading to the transfer of the function of handling taxpayer’s 
complaints to his office. 
It is submitted that the establishment of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation as a 
dedicated tax complaint oversight institution provides a new lens through which the model of 
the South African tax Ombud can be analysed. As discussed above, the model of the South 
African tax Ombud was established based on ideas drawn from similar tax complaints 
oversight bodies in other countries. When Parliament considered these examples of tax-
specific oversight institutions, the Australian Inspector General of Taxation had not yet been 
established as a single monitoring body for taxpayer’s complaints. This begs the question of 
whether or not the model of the Inspector General of Taxation can offer alternative ideas of 
how a dedicated tax complaint monitoring body can function which, if adopted for South 
Africa, would go some way in addressing the concerns of critics of the model of the tax 
Ombud. 
Mandate of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation 
Most of the powers previously exercised by the Commonwealth or taxation Ombud have now 
been vested in the Inspector General of Taxation. In terms of the amended Inspector General 
of Taxation Act, 28 of 2003 (at section 7(1)(a)), the Inspector General of Taxation has the 
mandate to investigate complaints made by a particular entity over an action performed by a 
tax official relating to administrative matters in the application of a taxation law. In terms of 
section 7(1)(c) of the same Act, the Inspector General of Taxation also has the mandate to 
investigate systems established by the Australian Tax Office, Tax Practitioners Board or any 
entity charged with the administration of a tax law, to the extent that the investigation relates 
to administrative matters. 
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In many respects the mandate of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation mirrors the 
functions and mandate of the South African tax Ombud. Section 16 of the Tax 
Administration Act limits the mandate of the South African tax Ombud to investigating and 
addressing matters of a procedural or administrative nature. Similarly, the Inspector General 
of Taxation Act (at section 7(2)) precludes the Inspector General of Taxation from 
investigating objections by a taxpayer over an obligation to pay tax or the quantification of an 
amount due under a tax assessment. The point is made explicitly in section 7 of the Inspector 
General of Taxation Act that the mandate of the Inspector General covers administrative 
matters only. An example found in the Inspector General of Taxation Act (at section 
7(1)(c)(ii) and (ii)) of administrative matters subject to the Inspector General’s review, is the 
manner in which the Australian Tax Office, the Tax Practitioners Board or any other body 
enforcing tax legislation deals with or communicates with the public. 
The Tax Administration Act (at section 16(2)(f)) gives the South African tax Ombud the 
power to identify and review systemic issues even without a complaint preceding such 
investigation. Section 8(1) of the Inspector General of Taxation Act likewise provides that the 
Australian Inspector General of Taxes may conduct an investigation on his own initiative. In 
terms of section 8(2) of the Inspector General of Taxation Act, the Inspector General of 
Taxation may be directed by the Australian Minister of Finance to investigate a systemic 
issue in the functioning of the Australian Tax Office, Tax Practitioners Board or any other 
entity administering a tax law.  
The Australian Inspector General of Taxation, like the South African tax Ombud, has the 
discretion to decide not to pursue, or to discontinue an investigation. Section 9(c) to (h) of the 
Inspector General of Taxation Act lists the circumstances under which the Inspector General 
may exercise his or her discretion to continue or discontinue an investigation.  
Appointment of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation 
The terms of the Inspector General of Taxation Act (at section 28(1)) provide that the 
Inspector General of Taxation must be appointed by the Governor-General of Australia, who 
in turn is appointed by the British monarch. It follows therefore that, similarly with the South 
African tax Ombud, the appointment of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation is not 
made by Parliament, but rather by a member of the executive.  
The Australian Governor General is obligated by the Inspector General of Taxation Act (at 
section 35(1)) to terminate the appointment of the Inspector General of Taxation if he or she 
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performs or in some cases fails to perform certain specified acts. These acts include inter 
alia: if the Inspector General of Taxation becomes bankrupt or if he or she applies for 
bankruptcy or insolvency relief. The Inspector General of Taxation Act (at section 35(2)) also 
grants the Governor General the discretion to dismiss the Inspector General of Taxation, but 
only under certain specified conditions. These conditions mirror those that must be present 
before the South African Minister of Finance can dismiss a tax Ombud. In terms of section 
35(2) of the Inspector General of Taxation Act, the Governor General may dismiss the 
Inspector General on the grounds of misbehaviour or physical or mental incapacity. 
There is a noteworthy difference in the manner of appointment of the Australian Inspector 
General of Taxation and the South African tax Ombud in that the former is appointed by the 
highest executive office in the country whilst the latter’s appointment falls to a Cabinet 
Minister. It is submitted, however, that this difference is superficial as both complaint 
handling bodies have the same reporting lines. In terms of the Inspector General of Taxation 
Act (at section 41), the Inspector General of Taxation, like his South African counterpart 
must submit an annual report to the Australian Minister of Finance. The Inspector General of 
Taxation cannot report directly to Parliament but like his South African counterpart, the 
Australian Minister of Finance must submit the Inspector General’s report before the 
Australian House of Assembly. 
By leaving the Australian Parliament out of the appointment of the Inspector General, the 
model of the Inspector General of Taxation follows the example of other tax-specific 
oversight models, including the South African tax Ombud. Critics of the South African tax 
Ombud model have argued for the Ombud to be given the power to report directly to 
Parliament for greater independence. The model of the Australian inspector General of 
Taxation does not offer an alternative as the Inspector General can only access Parliament 
indirectly through his or her annual reports to the Minister of Finance. It is therefore 
submitted that as far as the appointment and reporting provisions of the model of the 
Inspector General of Taxation are concerned, no new insights can be derived which would 
address the concerns of critics of the model of the South African tax Ombud. 
Staffing of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation 
In terms of the Tax Administration Act, the tax Ombud’s staff must be employed in terms of 
SARS Act. In terms of the SARS Act (at section 18(1)) all employees of SARS, other than 
employees in the management structures of SARS, are employed subject to the terms and 
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conditions determined by SARS. Furthermore, the Tax Administration Act (at section 15(1)) 
provides that the tax Ombud’s staff are seconded to the Ombud’s office upon his or her 
request, but in consultation with the Commissioner for SARS. The staffing provisions of the 
South African tax Ombud have drawn disapproval from critics, with some stakeholders 
believing that the tax Ombud will never be able to function independently if his or her staff 
and funding come out of SARS.  
The Inspector General of Taxation Act (at section 36(1)) provides that the Australian 
Inspector General of Taxation’s staff must be appointed in terms of the Public Service Act, 
147 of 1999. It follows therefore that, unlike in South Africa where the terms and conditions 
of the staff of the tax Ombud are determined by SARS, the staff of the Inspector General of 
Taxation fall under the public service and their terms and conditions of employment are to be 
discovered in the Public Service Act.  
In terms of the Australian Public Services Constitution, which is contained in the Public 
Service Act (at section 9), the Australian Public Service consists of separate agency heads 
and public service employees. It is submitted that in stating that the staff of the Inspector 
General of Taxation must be employed in terms of the Public Service Act, the Inspector 
General of Taxation Act implicitly identifies the Inspector as a distinct agency head with a 
dedicated staff which falls under his or her supervision and authority. It is important to note 
that under section 19 of the Public Services Act, an agency head has the power to impose 
sanctions on his or her staff and this power is not subject to the direction of any Minister. 
Section 20 of the Public Service Act makes the point explicitly that an agency head has all 
the powers, duties and rights of an employer in respect of staff appointed to his or her agency. 
It is submitted that the staffing provisions offer a new perspective on how the South African 
tax Ombud’s staffing requirements could potentially have been provided for. By establishing 
the Inspector General of Taxation as an agency head, with autonomy over the appointment 
and conditions of service of his staff, Australian lawmakers provided an alternative method of 
staffing a tax complaint oversight body which could satisfy critics of the South African tax 
Ombud. 
Funding of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation 
Section 15(4) of the Tax Administration Act provides that expenses incurred by the tax 
Ombud in the performance of his or her mandate must be paid out of the funds of SARS. 
According to the SARS Act (at section 25(1)) SARS’ chief source of income is money 
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appropriated annually by Parliament for the execution of its services. Section 25(2)(a)(ii) of 
the SARS Act goes on to provide that the annual amount appropriated to SARS by 
Parliament may be determined in any manner agreed to by the Commissioner for SARS and 
the Minister of Finance, with the Cabinet’s approval. It is submitted that if the provisions of 
section 15(4) of the Tax Administration Act are read together with section 25(2)(a)(ii) of the 
SARS Act, the conclusion can be drawn that the Commissioner for SARS is substantially 
involved in the determination of how much money is ultimately available to the tax Ombud 
for the execution of his or her duties.   
On the other hand, the Australian Inspector General of Taxation’s office is funded directly 
from the Australian Federal Budget. In its 2015-16 Budget, the Australian Federal Parliament 
announced that it would be allocating 14.6 million dollars to the Inspector General of 
Taxation over the next five years to support its operations (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2015). In contrast to the position in South Africa, the Inspector General of Taxation’s funding 
comes directly from the Parliament of Australia and not indirectly from the Australian Tax 
Office as is the case with the South African tax Ombud and SARS. 
There are other concerns raised by critics of the South African model of a tax Ombud which 
could be addressed if certain ideas, used in the model of the Inspector General of Taxation, 
are imported into South Africa’s model. It has been mentioned that the South African tax 
Ombud is established within the provisions of the Tax Administration Act. Some academics 
have raised the point that the tax Ombud should have been established in terms of a separate 
piece of legislation to bolster the perception that the Ombud is independent from SARS. In 
Australia, the Inspector General of Taxation is established in terms of a separate piece of 
legislation in the form of the Inspector General of Taxation Act. 
It is submitted that there is some doubt over whether or not the mere act of establishing the 
South African tax Ombud in a separate legislative document would support the impression 
that the tax Ombud is an independent and impartial institution. The tax Ombud is provided 
for in the Tax Administration Act and not in terms of the SARS Act. If the objects and 
purpose of the Tax Administration Act are examined, it is submitted that the Tax 
Administrative Act serves a different function to the SARS Act in that it regulates the 
administrative affairs in the implementation of all tax legislation. Whether the Tax 
Administration Act is so closely linked to the institution of SARS as to warrant a conclusion 
that establishing the tax Ombud within the Tax Administration Act creates an inappropriate 
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link with SARS is, with respect, doubtful. Nevertheless, adopting the Australian manner of 
establishing the tax oversight institution in terms of a separate legislative document in South 
Africa, would ostensibly answer this particular concern.  
3.8 Conclusion 
In establishing a South African tax Ombud, South African lawmakers incorporated several 
ideas from the overseas tax complaints oversight models which they considered. The 
Canadian model of the Taxpayer’s Ombud was ostensibly perceived as the main source of 
provisions for the South African tax Ombud. It can be concluded, after a comparison of the 
eventual model of a South African tax Ombud with the other models of tax oversight bodies 
considered, that the South African Parliament established the tax Ombud in a manner that 
was consistent with international trends and other tax specific oversight institutions. 
Some critics and experts, however, remain unconvinced that the model of the tax Ombud, 
though consistent with international examples, will function as desired. Concerns were raised 
that the provisions of the Tax Administration which provide for the appointment, funding and 
staffing of the tax Ombud would inhibit the Ombud from executing his mandate 
independently and impartially as required. It was alleged that the offending provisions create 
the impression of institutional bias within the Office of the tax Ombud with the Ombud being 
rendered insufficiently independent from SARS in its composition and source of support. 
The recently created Office of the Inspector General of Taxation in Australia is a source of 
possible alternatives to certain aspects of the model of the South African tax Ombud. The 
manner that the Inspector General of Taxations is staffed and supported offers a different 
perspective on how an independent tax complaint oversight body can be developed. In spite 
of the criticism levied on the establishment of the South African tax Ombud, the drafters of 
the Tax Administration Act assert that the establishment of the Ombud conforms not only to 
international trends, but also to South Africa’s legal and constitutional framework.  
In light of the tax Ombud and the South African Parliament’s assertions that the Ombud is 
bound by the Constitution and was developed under the overarching supremacy of the 
Constitution, the next chapter will initiate an investigation into the accuracy of these claims. 
It will be investigated in the next chapter whether or not there is a legal test for institutional 
bias in South Africa. The Constitution of South Africa and the legal tests and principles 
which flow from it will be analysed with the purpose of establishing a constitutional and legal 
test for institutional bias which can be used to scrutinise the model of the tax Ombud.  
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Chapter 4: Legal Test for Institutional Bias 
4.1 Introduction 
There is divergence between, on the one hand, the aspirations of the Parliament to create a 
truly independent and impartial body capable of reviewing and addressing the SARS 
administrative shortcomings, and on the other hand, concern from certain academics and 
experts that the manner in which the tax Ombud has been established makes the aspirations 
of independence and impartiality impossible to realise. Parliament, however, has claimed that 
the model of the tax Ombud conforms to South Africa’s constitutional framework. 
This chapter will address the third goal of this research, which is to determine the correct 
legal test for institutional bias by analysing the legal framework through which allegations of 
bias against the model of the tax Ombud can be tested. In doing this, a precise test for 
institutional bias will be developed by analysing the broad constitutional principles which 
apply to cases of bias and the judicial decisions and tests which flow from these broad 
principles. The focus of this chapter is on the legal tests applicable in the determination of 
institutional bias and does not include other non-legal forms of review.  
4.2 Constitutional supremacy 
The supremacy of the Constitution is highlighted in section 2 of that document. Section 2 
states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and “law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid.” In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) Chaskalson CJ (at 
405) explained the role of the Constitution in South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation. 
He held that the Constitution had to be elevated above all other statutes. Chaskalson CJ (at 
405) described the prominence of the Constitution as follows: 
It is the source of legislative and executive authority. It determines how the 
country is to be governed and how legislation is to be enacted. It defines the 
powers of the different organs of State, including Parliament, the executive, and 
the courts, as well as the fundamental rights of every person which must be 
respected in exercising such powers. 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of South Africa: In re ex parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers) Chaskalson, P, as he then was, also held (at 697) that all law in the Republic 
derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control. It is submitted 
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that the binding findings of the Constitutional Court of South Africa indicate that in 
determining the legal appropriateness of any legislation, the Constitution must be the starting 
point of the inquiry as it is from the Constitution that all legislation derives its authority. 
In terms of section 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to 
enact legislation to regulate any matter. Section 44(4) of the Constitution imposes a duty on 
Parliament to act in accordance with, and within the limitations of the Constitution in the 
exercise of its legislative authority. It follows therefore in enacting legislation, such as the 
Tax Administration Act, Parliament has an overarching responsibility to ensure that the laws 
it passes conform with the Constitution and any limitations imposed by that document.  
Section 167(5) of the Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court has the final say on 
whether or not an Act of Parliament is constitutional. It follows, therefore, that a challenge 
that Parliament erred in the execution of its legislative duty by enacting legislation which is 
unconstitutional must ultimately be settled by the Constitutional Court. Section 167(5) 
provides that rulings from other courts that a particular law is unconstitutional have no force 
or effect unless confirmed by the Constitutional Court.  
4.2.1 The Bill of Rights 
A key feature of the South African Constitution is that it contains a Bill of Rights. The Bill of 
Rights is described in section 7 of the Constitution as the “cornerstone of democracy” and 
entrenches the Constitution’s core values. The Bill of Rights is captured in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution and enshrines the rights of every person in South Africa, reinforcing the values 
of dignity, equality and freedom.  
In terms of section 8(1) of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights applies to all law in the 
Republic and is binding on all organs of state, the legislature, the judiciary and members of 
the executive. In addition to being applicable to all the branches of the State, section 8(2) of 
the Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights is also applicable to natural and juristic 
persons, but only to the extent that the nature of the right and nature of duty imposed by the 
right allow.  
Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that whenever a court, tribunal or any other 
forum has been called upon to interpret the Bill of Rights, the court, tribunal or forum must 
formulate an interpretation which promotes the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Section 39(2) of the Constitution goes 
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on to provide that in the interpretation of any legislation by a court, tribunal or any other 
forum the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights must be promoted. 
4.2.2 Right to Just Administrative Action 
The Bill of Rights provides for the protection of a variety of rights. These range from the 
most fundamental individual rights, such as the right to dignity and life, in sections 10 and 11 
respectively, to the more generic rights such as the right to a safe and sustainable 
environment, in section 24 of the Constitution. In the public administration arena, the most 
relevant provision in the Bill of Rights is captured in section 33 of the Constitution which 
guarantees the right to just administrative action. 
Section 33 of the Constitution provides that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action 
has the right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must— 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) 
and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
It follows that section 33 of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to just 
administrative action. Just administrative action is described as administrative action that 
satisfies the three requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. 
Significantly, section 33(3) of this provision imposes an obligation on the legislature to enact 
legislation to give effect to the just administrative action requirement in the Constitution. 
According to section 33, such legislation must, among other things, promote efficient 
administration and allow for the review of administrative action by a court, or at least an 
independent and impartial tribunal, where appropriate. The legislature responded to the 
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obligation imposed on it by section 33 of the Constitution by enacting the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as PAJA).  
4.3 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and section 33 of the Constitution 
According to its preamble, PAJA was enacted to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution 
and regulate ancillary matters related to the right to just administrative action. In its preamble, 
PAJA states that one of its objects is to promote efficient administration and good 
governance.  
In Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) (hereinafter 
referred to as Bato Star) the applicant sought to set aside the allocation of fishing quotas set 
by the Department of Environmental Affairs. O’Regan J, who wrote the decision for the 
court, held (at 504) that a court’s power to review administrative action stems from the 
Constitution and PAJA. She held further (at 506) that the Constitution was the highest source 
of administrative law and its provisions had been given effect by the enactment of PAJA. The 
Constitutional Court held (at 507) that a review of administrative action had to be based on 
the provisions of PAJA, which draws its authority from the Constitution. In this respect, it 
was concluded (at 507) that the judicial review of administrative action could not be done 
without reference to the provisions of PAJA. 
It follows from the Bato Star judgment that, whilst the Constitution sets out in general terms 
what the right to just administrative action entails, PAJA elaborates on the specific 
requirements which bring an administrative act into conformity with the Constitution. PAJA 
therefore adds flesh to the framework of just administrative action set out in section 33 of the 
Constitution. It can be deduced from the Bato Star case, that the review of an administrative 
act must be based on the provisions of PAJA, which interpret section 33 of the Constitution. 
According to the Constitutional Court in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 CC(hereinafter referred to as Fedsure) 
(at 391), law making processes of deliberative legislative bodies, like the National Assembly, 
can seldom be described as administrative. It follows, therefore, that if criticism regarding the 
South African tax Ombud model was directed at the process followed by Parliament which 
led to the development of the model, such concerns would not be open to judicial review. In 
the tax Ombud’s case, concerns raised by critics were raised in respect of the content of the 
final model chosen and not the process leading to the development of the model. Whilst, 
according to the Constitutional Court, legislative processes are not open to judicial review, it 
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is submitted that the same does not apply for the resulting legislation. This submission is 
bolstered by the provisions of section 167(5) of the Constitution which give the 
Constitutional Court the power to decide on the constitutionality or otherwise of any Act of 
Parliament. 
In Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC) 
(hereinafter referred to as Zondi) the Constitutional Court explained the process to be 
followed when a constitutional challenge is made against legislation on the ground that the 
particular legislation offends the right to just administrative action. It was held (at 622) that a 
constitutional challenge on the validity of administrative legislation must be based on section 
33 of the Constitution and not PAJA. The Constitutional Court held (at 622), however, that 
PAJA is relevant in deciding a challenge against the constitutionality of administrative action 
as the meaning and import of section 33 is found in PAJA. It was held (at 622) that in cases 
where legislation is challenged based on the right to administrative action, the court must 
determine whether or not the offending legislation can be read together with the Constitution. 
If the legislation can be read together with the Constitution then it will pass constitutional 
scrutiny, and vice versa. 
It follows from the Zondi case that where it is alleged that certain legislation infringes on the 
right to just administrative action as provided for in section 33 of the Constitution, the alleged 
infringement must be decided in terms of the Constitution and not in terms of PAJA. The 
infringement will not be regarded as unconstitutional if, notwithstanding the infringement, it 
can still be read together with the Constitution. It also follows from the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Zondi that the provisions of PAJA, and the cases which interpret 
them, remain an intrinsic part of the inquiry because it is only from these that the import of 
section 33 can be gathered. It is, however, submitted that before any challenge or review can 
be commenced in terms of section 33 of the Constitution, it must first be established whether 
or not the offending legislation falls within the ambit of section 33. 
4.3.1 Meaning of administrative action  
South African courts have consistently held that the meaning and import of section 33 of the 
Constitution is found in the provisions of PAJA. For purposes of defining administrative 
action, the relevant part of PAJA is section 1 which defines administrative action as:  
[A]ny decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by— 
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(a) an organ of state, when— 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, 
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal 
effect. 
It is submitted that the definition of “administrative action” in PAJA is useful when deciding 
whether or not a particular act or series of acts constitute administrative action. The definition 
is, however, not as useful in a discussion such as the present one, where the aim is to 
determine whether or not certain provisions of the Tax Administration Act fall within the 
ambit of administrative action. In the Zondi judgment, the court confirmed the inadequacy of 
PAJA in instances where legislation and not conduct is challenged. In that case, it was held 
(at 622) that a challenge which alleges that legislation infringes on the right to just 
administrative action must be based on section 33 of the Constitution and not PAJA.  
The deficiency in the definition of administrative action contained in section 1 of PAJA was 
also noted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Greys Marine Hout Bay v Minister of Public 
Works 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA). Nugent JA, who wrote the decision for the court, bemoaned 
the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes administrative action. He described (at 322) 
the definition of administrative action in section 1 of PAJA as “cumbersome” and held that it 
did little to shed light on the meaning of the term. He held that instead of attributing meaning 
to the term, the definition merely consisted of qualifications which serve to limit the 
interpretation of administrative action and specifically exclude certain functions from its 
ambit. In light of the inadequacy of PAJA in defining administrative legislation, it is 
submitted that guidance must be sought from decisions of our courts which have attempted to 
define the concept of administrative action under the common law and under section 33 of 
the Constitution. 
In the case of Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) (hereinafter referred to as Hira) the court 
examined its common law right to review administrative action. This case was decided prior 
to the enactment of the final Constitution and the enactment of PAJA. It must, however, be 
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noted that in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, the Constitutional Court held (at 696) 
that the common law is still relevant to the development of administrative law and informs 
the interpretation of the Constitution and PAJA.  
In the Hira judgment, the Appellate Court articulated the circumstances under which the 
exercise of power, particularly the exercise of power by a public body, could be reviewed. 
The court referred, with approval, to the dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case 
of Johannesburg Consolidated Company v Langleigh Construction 1991 (1) SA 576 (AD). It 
was held (at 115) that the non-performance or wrong performance of a statutory duty in 
which a third party is aggrieved is capable of coming under judicial review. In the Hira 
judgment (at 84) the court expanded on this definition of administrative action and held that it 
also applies to the non-performance or wrong performance of a statutory duty or power 
vested in an individual official.   
It is submitted that the definition given by the court in the Hira case indicates that under 
common law, where a duty has been imposed on a public official by a statute, the execution 
of that duty constitutes the performance of administrative action. The link between the 
performance of a statutory duty and administrative review continued even after the 
introduction of the Constitution.  
In President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
(hereinafter referred to as SARFU) 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), the Constitutional Court had to 
decide whether or not a decision by the President of South Africa to appoint a Commission of 
Inquiry into the affairs of the South African Rugby Football Union could be reviewed by the 
court on the basis that it infringed the right to just administrative action. It was held (at 67) 
that what matters the most in deciding whether or not conduct falls into the category of 
administrative action is the function being performed and not the functionary who performs 
it. It was held, further, that if the conduct in question amounts to the implementation of 
legislation then the conduct fits into the definition of administration action as contemplated 
under section 33 of the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the conduct amounts to the 
implementation of government policy then such conduct, it was held (at 67), does not fall 
within the ambit of administrative action.  
The Constitutional Court in the SARFU case intimated (at 67) that the distinction between the 
implementation of legislation and the implementation of policy may, in certain cases, be 
difficult to draw. The court, however, hastened to add (at 68) that each matter must be 
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decided on a case by case basis which gives effect to the “overall constitutional purpose of an 
efficient, equitable and ethical public administration.” It is submitted that the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in SARFU is prescriptive when it comes to the determination of what 
constitutes administrative action in terms of section 33 of the Constitution.  
If the SARFU and Hira judgments are read together, it can be concluded that where a 
statutory duty is imposed on an official, the performance of that duty will amount to the 
carrying out of administrative action. It is submitted that the dictum in both judgments can be 
adapted to define the meaning of administrative legislation. If, based on the two judgments of 
the Constitutional Court, the performance of a statutorily imposed duty amounts to 
administrative action then it is submitted that administrative legislation can be defined as 
legislation that imposes a duty to act on a body, especially if the body in question is a public 
body. This type of administrative legislation would be subject to scrutiny in terms of section 
33 of the Constitution. 
The Tax Administration Act imposes several duties to act on various parties in the tax dispute 
resolution framework. For instance, section 16(1) of the Tax Administration Act imposes a 
duty on the tax Ombud to review and address taxpayer complaints relating to SARS’ 
administrative conduct. Other duties are imposed on the Minister of Finance and the 
Commissioner for SARS. In the former case, section 14(1) of the Tax Administration Act 
imposes a duty on the Minister to appoint a tax Ombud and in the latter case, the 
Commissioner has a duty to fund and staff the office of the tax Ombud in terms of sections 
15(4) and 15(1). If the submission that legislation that imposes a duty to act on a public 
official constitutes administrative action holds, then the Tax Administration Act easily falls 
into this definition of administrative legislation which is subject to scrutiny in terms of 
section 33 of the Constitution.   
Having argued that the Tax Administration Act is capable of review based on the section 33 
right to just administrative action in the Constitution, the exact import of the right to just 
administrative action remains to be established. Specifically, it must be determined which 
grounds for review are available under section 33 and under which circumstances legislation 
can be considered to be infringing on the right to just administrative action.  
4.3.2 Grounds for review under section 33  
Section 33 of the Constitution provides that just administrative action is action that is lawful, 
procedurally fair and reasonable. The converse of this is true; administrative action, or 
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legislation in this case, which is unlawful, unreasonable or not procedurally fair is unjust and 
would infringe on the constitutional right to just administrative action. The exact nature of 
what constitutes lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action is not defined 
in the Constitution.  
In the Zondi judgment, the Constitutional Court held (at 622) that the provisions of PAJA are 
relevant in an inquiry based on section 33 of the Constitution because the meaning and 
import of section 33 is found in PAJA. In line with the findings in the Zondi case, it is 
submitted that the meaning of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness must be 
sought for in the provisions of PAJA and the cases which interpret them.  
The grounds for when administrative action may be judicially reviewed are provided for in 
section 6 of PAJA. There are several grounds for review under section 6 of PAJA, however, 
this thesis will limit the discussion on the grounds of review to the most relevant ground or 
grounds for review. Relevancy, in this sense, is based on the criticism levied against the Tax 
Administration Act. As discussed in chapter 3, concern has been raised over a perceived lack 
of independence of the tax Ombud from SARS. According to section 6(2)(a)(iii) of PAJA, a 
court or tribunal has the power to review administrative action if the administrator who took 
it was biased or is reasonably suspected of bias.  
Mokgoro J, in De lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC), held (at 835) that the elimination of 
bias from decision making processes is a key tenet of procedural fairness. The case was heard 
before the enactment of PAJA and was concerned with bias in decisions of presiding officers 
in insolvency proceedings. However, it is submitted that the findings are relevant to 
understanding the concept of bias as it presently fits into our law. Mokgoro J held (at 835) 
that the removal of bias from decision making is aimed at eliminating arbitrary decision 
making in a manner that gives effect to the rule of law. Commenting on the importance of an 
unbiased decision, the court held (at 835 and 836) that: 
Everyone is entitled to an impartial Judge, not because this guarantees a correct 
decision, but because the human arbiter, not being omniscient, should not be 
presented with a point of view that his or her position inherently loads. 
4.4 The “Reasonable suspicion of bias” test 
BTR Industries South Africa v Metal and Allied Workers Union (hereinafter referred to as 
BTR) 1992 (3) SA 673 (A) was decided before the enactment of PAJA and dealt with the 
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notion of bias. Specifically, the Appellate Court in the BTR judgment dealt with how to 
determine bias in the decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial officials. In that case, the 
Appellate Court enunciated the judicial principles applicable in determining whether or not a 
judicial officer’s decision was tainted with bias. 
In the BTR judgment, allegations of a suspicion of bias were levelled against a member of the 
Industrial Court. At the time that the judgment was delivered, the court held (at 690) that 
there was some confusion as to which test for bias was the appropriate test for application by 
South African courts. The contenders to the title were the “real likelihood of bias” test and 
the “real suspicion of bias” test. Hoexter JA explained (at 690) the distinction between the 
two. It was held that the “real likelihood of bias” test connotes a higher standard of proof in 
that there must be a more than fifty percent chance that the bias alleged will eventuate or has 
occurred. A “real suspicion of bias”, it was held, connotes a lower standard of proof in that a 
suspicion can be sustained without real proof as to the existence of the object of the 
suspicion.   
The Appellate Court in the BTR case held (at 694) that the public has a right to have cases it 
places before the courts decided impartially without favour or prejudice. In light of this right 
it was held that the “real likelihood of bias” test, which connotes a higher standard of proof, 
would impede the administration of justice. It was therefore concluded (at 694) that the test to 
be applied in South Africa is the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test.   
In Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Monnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A) 
(hereinafter referred to as Council of Review), the court did not clearly distinguish between 
the “real likelihood of bias” test and the “real suspicion of bias” test. It was held however (at 
490) that a suspicion includes the idea of a mere possibility of existence in the present or 
future. It was cautioned that in order for a suspicion to be upheld, it must be founded on 
reasonable grounds. Significantly, it was also held (at 490) that the fact that the judicial 
officer was in reality partial or is likely to be partial is not the test. It was held that the 
reasonable perception of the parties as to the judicial officer’s impartiality is what is 
important.  
The Appellate Court held in the BTR case (at 695) that in applying the “reasonable suspicion 
of bias” test, a court must invoke the legal fiction of the reasonable man. It must be 
determined, it was held, whether or not the reasonable man in the litigant’s circumstances 
would harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias. The reasonable man, it was held (at 695), is a 
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fictitious persona who possesses ordinary intelligence, knowledge and common sense.  It was 
held further (at 695), that the test is essentially an objective one, but the unique circumstances 
of each case should not be ignored. The court, it was concluded (at 695), had to place itself in 
the position of a reasonable man in the position of the aggrieved litigant, disregarding the 
particular litigant’s individual superstitions and particular intelligence. 
It must be noted that the pronouncements of the Appellate Court in the BTR and Council of 
Review cases were concerned with deciding allegations of bias against judicial officers and 
persons who occupy a quasi-judicial function. It is submitted that a distinction can be drawn 
between the judicial and quasi-judicial bias investigated by the Appellate Court in BTR and 
Council of Review, and institutional bias which forms the subject of this discussion. Concerns 
over the independence of the tax Ombud are not directed at the tax Ombud in his or her 
personal capacity but rather at institutional factors which give rise to an apprehension of 
institutional bias. It therefore falls to be determined whether or not the “reasonable suspicion 
of bias” test, articulated in the BTR and Council of Review judgments for cases of judicial 
bias, can be adapted for situations were bias is alleged at an institutional level.  
4.4.1 Judicial Test for Institutional bias  
In the case of Dumbu v Commissioner of Prisons 1992 (1) SA 58 (E) (hereinafter referred to 
as Dumbu), a case decided before the advent of the new Constitution and the enactment of 
PAJA, the Eastern Cape High Court held (at 62) that the “reasonable likelihood of bias” test 
was applicable in cases where bias was investigated at an institutional level. It must be 
recalled that according to the Appellate Court in the BTR judgment (at 690), the “reasonable 
likelihood of bias” test connotes a higher burden of proof because in order to sustain a claim 
for bias based on that test, there must be a greater than fifty percent likelihood that the bias 
will occur. Following the introduction of the Constitution and PAJA the highest court in the 
land, the Constitutional Court, made a pronouncement on the test to be applied to determine 
institutional bias in South Africa.  
In the case of Islamic Unity Convention v Minister of Telecommunications 2008 (3) SA 383 
(CC) (hereinafter referred to as Islamic Unity) the constitutional validity of certain sections of 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 153 of 1993 had been challenged. The thrust of 
the challenge was that the sections gave the Broadcasting Monitoring Complaints Committee 
the powers to not only decide whether or not a complaint merited a hearing but also to 
adjudicate the complaint once it was set down for hearing.  
64 
 
It was contended before the Constitutional Court in the Islamic Unity case (at 400) that the 
offending provisions of the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act gave rise to an inherent 
bias or a reasonable suspicion of bias. It was contended that the alleged bias emerged from 
the fact that the body tasked with deciding whether or not a complaint merited a hearing was 
the same body tasked with adjudicating the matter. The applicants argued (at 400) that by 
being granted the power to adjudicate the same matter it had referred for a hearing, the 
Broadcasting Monitoring Complaints Committee would be inclined to justify its decision to 
hear the matter in the manner which it adjudicates over the complaint. It was argued (at 401) 
that the reasonable licensee appearing before a tribunal of the Broadcasting Monitoring 
Complaints Committee would apprehend that the body was not impartial as it was charged 
with both investigative and adjudicatory powers.  
Writing the decision for the Constitutional Court in the Islamic Unity case, Mpati AJ held (at 
403) that unlike in the BTR judgment, the matter before the court in this instance did not 
concern an application for recusal of a presiding officer. Instead, it was held, the applicant’s 
challenge concerned structural rather than individual bias. To elaborate, Mpati AJ held (at 
403) that the bias alleged was a result of institutional factors and not individual prejudice.  
In the Islamic Unity case, the Constitutional Court adapted the “reasonable suspicion of bias” 
test to the matter before it. The Constitutional Court accepted (at 405), without deciding, that 
the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test as enunciated in the BTR judgment applied to cases of 
determining institutional bias as well. It was held (at 410) that in order to succeed, the thrust 
of the applicant’s challenge was that a reasonable person in the position of the applicant 
would reasonably apprehend that the Broadcasting Monitoring Complaints Committee might 
not be impartial, fair or independent in deciding a matter before it.  
It follows from the decision of the Constitutional Court in the Islamic Unity judgment that the 
“reasonable suspicion of bias” test is applicable where bias is alleged at an institutional level. 
According to the Constitutional Court, it must be determined whether or not a reasonable 
person in the position of the aggrieved party would reasonably suspect that the decision 
maker would not be impartial in making his or her decision due to institutional factors.  
It is submitted that pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in other cases where the 
“reasonable suspicion of bias” test was used show that the perception of partiality is what is 
important and not whether or not the decision maker was actually partial. For instance, in the 
Council of Review matter, the Appellate Court held (at 490) that in order for a challenge to 
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succeed based on the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test all that is required is that the 
suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds. According to the Constitutional Court in the 
BTR case (at 695), reasonableness is determined from the perspective of the reasonable man 
endowed with ordinary intelligence, knowledge and common sense. 
Alternative models or tests to determine institutional bias have been proposed. It has been 
suggested that the existence of a reasonable suspicion of bias should not automatically render 
the decision of an administrator unlawful (Nwauche, 2005). It has been proposed that the 
existence of factors which give credence to a suspicion of bias can be cured if appropriate 
judicial oversight is ensured (Nwauche, 2005). In terms of this model, the “reasonable 
suspicion of bias” test, when applied to the determination of institutional bias, would have the 
caveat that the power of an independent and impartial tribunal, such as a Magistrate’s Court, 
to review the decision process can cure the defect where a reasonable suspicion of bias is 
present (Nwauche, 2005). It will be shown in the discussion which follows, that the idea of 
the possibility of curing a biased administrative process has apparently been approved of by 
South African courts. 
4.4.2 Curing a reasonable suspicion of bias  
It has been shown that in order to prove institutional bias, one must prove a reasonably 
founded suspicion that the decision maker will not act independently in exercising the 
mandate. In order for the bias to be termed “institutional”, the factors giving rise to the 
suspicion must be systemic or institutional. In the Islamic Unity judgment, the Constitutional 
Court indicated (at 406), that where the execution of administrative action is tainted with a 
suspicion of bias, the procedure can be cured if there are safeguards to ensure that the process 
is ultimately a fair one.  
There is legal authority which supports the Constitutional Court’s finding that administrative 
action which is tainted with bias, and consequently falls foul of the procedural fairness 
requirement in section 33 of the Constitution, can be cured. This legal authority comes from 
the most authoritative legal document in South Africa, the Constitution. Section 7 of the 
Constitution provides that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not absolute. 
According to that section, the rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to limitation in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution. 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution provides that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights may 
only be limited in terms of a law of general application. Furthermore, the limitation must be 
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reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on dignity, equality and 
freedom. Section 36(1)(a) to (e) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors which must be 
considered in determining whether the limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights is reasonable 
and justified. These factors are:  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Section 36(2) of the Constitution provides that no other law may limit the rights entrenched 
in the Bill of Rights except for the limitations in section 36(1) of the Constitution, or in terms 
of another provision in the Constitution. It follows therefore that the rights entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights apply universally, except to the extent that they may be limited in conformity 
with the Constitution.  
In the Zondi matter, the Constitutional Court held (at 622) that where it is alleged that 
legislation infringes the right to just administrative action, the court must determine whether 
or not the offending legislation can be read in line with the Constitution. If the legislation, 
notwithstanding the fact that it infringes on the right to just administrative action, can still be 
read together with the Constitution, then it will pass Constitutional muster.  
It follows that in circumstances where judicial review is sought for, allegations that 
provisions of the Tax Administration Act which provide for the functioning of the tax Ombud 
infringe on the right to just administrative action must be adjudicated in terms of section 33 
of the Constitution. If it is determined that there is indeed an infringement on the right to just 
administrative action, in that the offending provisions of the Tax Administration Act give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion of institutional bias, the defect can be cured if there are safeguards 
to ensure that fairness prevails. It is submitted that this form of limitation of the right to just 
administrative action is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, which allow for a 
right in the Bill of Rights to be limited provided that the limitation conforms to the 
Constitution. 
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In the Islamic Unity case, the Constitutional Court held (at 411) that the constitutional right to 
just administrative action, when asserted, must be reviewed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. In line with this situational approach to determining constitutionality, the 
court, after considering the unique facts of the case before it, identified factors in the case 
which made the otherwise biased process a fair one. It was held (at 407) that the fact that the 
relevant legislation dictated that the chairperson of the Broadcasting Monitoring Complaints 
Committee should be a judge of the High Court or an experienced legal professional was a 
step in ensuring that the process followed by the Broadcasting Monitoring Complaints 
Committee in resolving a dispute is a fair one. It was also held (at 409) that the fact that the 
recommendations of the Broadcasting Monitoring Complaints Committee were not binding 
on the applicant was a further safeguard in ensuring that an otherwise prima facie partial 
process did not result in unfair outcomes.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In spite of a perceived lack of independence from SARS of the South African tax Ombud, 
Parliament has insisted that the model of the tax Ombud is consistent with international 
trends and conforms to South Africa’s legal and constitutional framework.  
The South African Parliament, in developing a model for a tax Ombud, had a constitutional 
duty to ensure that the model of the Ombud conforms to the Constitution and abides by the 
limitations set in that document. The right to just administrative action is enshrined in the Bill 
of Rights and Parliament has a duty to ensure that it gives effect to this right. 
The right to just administrative action entails that administrative action, when it is carried out, 
must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. It has been argued that the provisions of the 
Tax Administration Act which establish the tax Ombud diminish the necessary independence 
of the Ombud from SARS. The elimination of bias from administrative processes is a key 
tenet of procedural fairness. Allegations that the Tax Administration Act does not ensure the 
impartiality of the tax Ombud force an inquiry into whether or not Parliament fulfilled its 
constitutional duty in establishing the tax Ombud by ensuring that the model of the tax 
Ombud was unbiased. 
It has been shown that where legislation is challenged on the grounds of bias, the “reasonable 
suspicion of bias” test must be used to determine the veracity of the challenge. It must be 
determined whether or not a reasonably founded suspicion of bias can be sustained against 
the offending legislation. If a reasonable suspicion can be sustained then bias is proven.  
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However, this is not the end of the inquiry. Once a reasonable suspicion of bias is present, it 
must be determined whether or not appropriate safeguards have been put in place to cure the 
bias and ensure that fairness ultimately prevails.  
In the chapter which follows, the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test will be applied to the 
offending provisions of the Tax Administration Act which establish the tax Ombud. It will be 
determined whether or not the South African Parliament did enough to ensure that the model 
of the tax Ombud does not run contrary to constitutionally established principles. 
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will address the last goal of this research which is to apply the “reasonable 
suspicion of bias” test to the provisions of the Tax Administration Act which establish the 
office of the South African tax Ombud. After applying the test, it will be proposed what the 
likely outcome of a judicial challenge on the administrative fairness of the model of the tax 
Ombud would be. It will also be determined whether or not, based on the test for institutional 
bias, Parliament took adequate measures to ensure that the model of the tax Ombud would fit 
into South Africa’s legal and constitutional context. Based on the results of the enquiry, a 
way forward will be proposed to bring the model of the South African tax Ombud into line 
with the aspirations of the Constitution.  
5.2 The South African tax Ombud and the case for institutional bias 
It has been discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis that the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test 
applies in the determination of institutional bias. According to the court in the BTR case (at 
690), a suspicion of bias can be sustained even without actual proof of bias. In the Council of 
Review case it was held (at 490), that the reasonable suspicion of bias test seeks only to 
determine whether or not a reasonable perception or suspicion of bias can be sustained. It 
does not seek to determine whether or not the decision maker was partial in the past or likely 
to be partial in the future. The Constitutional Court in the Islamic Unity case (at 405) 
approved of the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test in inquiries into systemic or institutional 
bias. It was held that when allegations of institutional bias are made, the inquiry is whether or 
not the reasonable person would apprehend that the decision maker will not be impartial in 
the making of his or her decision. It follows from the findings of the Constitutional Court in 
the Islamic Unity case that, in applying the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test to the model of 
the tax Ombud, the test is whether or not a reasonable person would suspect that the tax 
Ombud will not be impartial in his or her decision making.  
In chapter 3 of this thesis allegations emanating from certain academics and experts that the 
tax Ombud is not sufficiently independent from SARS were discussed. The allegations are 
motivated by specific provisions of the Tax Administration Act. In order to apply the test for 
institutional bias to the offending provisions of the Tax Administration Act, it is submitted 
that it must first be ascertained whether or not the offending provisions of the Tax 
Administration Act give rise to a reasonable suspicion of bias in decisions of the tax Ombud.  
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5.2.1 The sources of institutional bias in the model of the South African tax Ombud. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis examined the sources of concern over the chosen model of a South 
African tax Ombud. It has been argued that the tax Ombud will not be able to operate 
independently for as long as the responsibility for his or her appointment lies with the 
Minister of Finance and not a legislative body (Ofori-Boateng, 2014). It has also been put 
forward that the tax Ombud should have been established in terms of a separate legal 
instrument and not in terms of the Tax Administration Act (Ofori-Boateng, 2014). Certain 
experts have also contended that the tax Ombud should be directly accountable to Parliament 
in order to ensure his or her independence (Klue, in du Preez, 2011). It follows that the 
manner of appointment of the tax Ombud and the lines of accountability that he or she must 
follow were identified by critics as one of the potential sources of institutional bias in the 
functions of the tax Ombud. 
In terms of section 15(1) of the Tax Administration Act, the staff of the tax Ombud must be 
seconded to his or her office from SARS and after consultation with the Commissioner for 
SARS. This provision in the Tax Administration Act was also found to have drawn the ire of 
critics who argue that the tax Ombud will not be perceived as independent of SARS if the 
staff of his or her office are seconded from SARS (Mollagee, in du Preez, 2011). Section 
15(4) of the Tax Administration Act provides that the costs of the tax Ombud must be borne 
out of SARS’ funds. Experts and academics have also criticised this provision of the Act 
arguing that the independence of the tax Ombud is diminished if the funding of the Ombud 
comes from SARS (Mollagee, in du Preez, 2011). 
According to the court in the BTR case (at 695), where a suspicion of bias is alleged, the 
suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds in order for the court to uphold the claim of 
bias. It must be determined, it was held (at 695), whether or not the reasonable person in the 
litigant’s circumstances would harbour a suspicion of bias. In the Islamic Unity case, it was 
held (at 405) that in cases where institutional bias is alleged, the test must be whether or not a 
reasonable person would form a suspicion that the decision maker will not be impartial in 
making his or her decisions. It follows that in cases where a suspicion of institutional bias is 
claimed, the grounds upon which the bias is claimed must be reasonable. Whether or not the 
grounds of bias are reasonable, it was held in the BTR judgment (at 695), is determined from 
the perspective of the reasonable man who possesses ordinary intelligence, knowledge and 
common sense.  
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It is submitted that in determining whether or not the suspicions of bias against the tax 
Ombud are reasonably founded, the context in which the tax Ombud operates must be 
examined. In the execution of his or her mandate to review and address service related 
complaints concerning SARS, the tax Ombud was given a wide discretion over the manner in 
which this function will be performed. In terms of sections 18(2)(a) and (b) of the Tax 
Administration Act, the tax Ombud has the power to decide whether or not a review of a 
complaint should be conducted, how the review should be conducted and whether or not the 
review should be terminated before its completion.  
The fact that the Minister of Finance is responsible for the appointment of the tax Ombud has 
been cited as one of the grounds upon which the independence of the tax Ombud can be 
challenged. The mandate of the tax Ombud is to investigate complaints related to SARS and 
not complaints related to the office of the Minister of Finance. It is difficult to conclude that 
the tax Ombud will be biased in favour of SARS in the exercise of his or her mandate simply 
because he or she was appointed by the Minister of Finance. The criticism of the appointment 
of the tax Ombud implies a link between the Minister of Finance and SARS which is, at 
most, tenuous. It is therefore submitted that the suspicion of bias in the functioning of the tax 
Ombud based on the premise that he or she is appointed by the Minister of Finance is 
unreasonable.  
Similar comments can be made over concerns that the tax Ombud should have been 
established outside the framework of the Tax Administration Act. It has been proposed that 
the tax Ombud should have been established in terms of a separate Act of Parliament in order 
to safeguard the independence of his or her office (Ofori-Boateng, 2014). It is submitted that 
the link implied between the perceived lack independence of the tax Ombud and the fact that 
his or her office is established within the framework of the Tax Administration Act has been 
exaggerated. Whilst the Tax Administration Act provides for a range of matters, some of 
which are in the sole domain of SARS, the provisions of the Tax Administration Act which 
provide for the establishment of the tax Ombud are contained in a separate section of the Act 
and are easily identifiable. It is submitted that establishing the tax Ombud in a separate Act 
and not a separate section of the Tax Administration Act would contribute little to improving 
the perception that the Ombud’s mandate is executed impartially. It is therefore submitted 
that attacking the model of the tax Ombud based on the premise that the Ombud was not 
established in terms of separate legislation is unreasonable.  
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With respect to criticism levelled against the staffing and funding provisions of the tax 
Ombud, it is submitted that the fact that staffing and funding of the tax Ombud comes from 
SARS can create the impression of an overlap between SARS and the tax Ombud’s internal 
operations. It is submitted that the fact that the body tasked with reviewing complaints related 
to SARS is funded and staffed through SARS leads to a reasonable suspicion that the tax 
Ombud will not be impartial or independent in executing his or her mandate. A reasonable 
suspicion can be sustained that the tax Ombud will be biased in favour of SARS in the 
execution of his or her mandate because the office of the tax Ombud is supported through 
SARS. It is submitted that SARS staff seconded to the tax Ombud may have a biased view in 
favour of SARS and therefore the suspicion of potential bias appears to be justified.  It is also 
possible that by restricting the budget of the tax Ombud, SARS could impede the activities of 
his or her office. Whether this would be a source of bias can be debated, but it is certainly a 
matter for concern. 
The fact that the funding and staffing provisions of the tax Ombud contained in the Tax 
Administration Act lead to a reasonable suspicion of bias is, however, not the end of the 
inquiry. In the Islamic Unity case (at 406) it was held that where a reasonable suspicion of 
bias is present, a further investigation must be conducted to determine whether or not the 
ostensible bias can be cured. In Islamic Unity (at 411) it was held that in determining whether 
or not the bias has been cured, one must make the determination within the surrounding facts 
and circumstances of the matter. In line with the provisions of section 36(1) of the 
Constitution, where the right to just administrative action or legislation is limited, it must be 
determined whether or not the limitation of the right is consistent with the dictates of the 
Constitution. Specifically, section 36(1) of the Constitution provides for the limitation of a 
right in the Bill of Rights, provided that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in society 
based on dignity, equality and freedom. 
5.2.2 Safeguards in the model of the tax Ombud 
It has been argued that the right to just administrative action is limited by the provisions of 
the Tax Administration Act, which regulate how the operations of the tax Ombud will be 
staffed and funded. It has also been argued that the staffing and funding provisions in the 
model of the tax Ombud give rise to a reasonable suspicion of institutional bias, which 
infringes on the procedural fairness requirement in the right to just administrative action. In 
the Zondi case (at 622) the Constitutional Court found that legislation which limits the right 
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to just administrative action must be checked to determine if, notwithstanding the limitation, 
it can still be read in line with the Constitution. The Constitution (at section 36(1)) provides 
for the limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights provided that the limitation is in terms of a 
law of general application, such as the Tax Administration Act, and provided that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable. 
In considering whether or not the infringement of the right to just administrative action in the 
matter before it was reasonable and justifiable, the Constitutional Court in Islamic Unity 
found factors which ensured fairness in spite of the limitation. It was found (at 407) that the 
fact the relevant legislation required that the chairman of the Broadcasting Monitoring 
Complaints Committee should be a judge of the High Court or an experienced legal 
professional assisted in curing the defective provisions of the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority Act. It was also held (at 409) that the fact that the decisions of the Broadcasting 
Monitoring Complaints Committee where not binding further ensured that the otherwise 
unfair administrative provisions remained fair.   
If the findings in the Islamic Unity case are considered within the context of the model of the 
South African tax Ombud, it appears that the South African Parliament put in place certain 
safeguards to cure perceived limitations to the right to just administrative action. Section 
14(5)(b) of the Tax Administration Act provides that the person appointed by the Minister of 
Finance to act as the tax Ombud must have a good background in customer service as well as 
tax law. Section 14(5)(c) of the Tax Administration Act goes on to provide that the person 
appointed as tax Ombud must not, in the five years preceding his or her appointment, have 
been convicted of certain listed offences in South Africa or elsewhere. These crimes include 
inter alia theft, forgery, perjury or any other crimes involving dishonesty. In line with the 
aforementioned conditions of appointment of the tax Ombud, the current Ombud, Judge 
Bernard Ngoepe, is a retired president of the High Court of South Africa and has substantial 
experience in legal practice. The Constitutional Court in the Islamic Unity case found (at 407) 
that the fact that the decision maker, in that case, had to be an experienced legal professional 
was a step towards ensuring fairness. It is therefore submitted that it can be concluded that 
provisions of the Tax Administration Act which require that the tax Ombud must have a good 
background in tax law and customer service also go some way towards ensuring fairness.   
In the Islamic Unity case, the court also held (at 409) that the fact that recommendations of 
the Broadcasting Monitoring Complaints Committee were not binding was a further step in 
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ensuring that an otherwise partial process remained fair. In terms of section 20(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act, the recommendations of the tax Ombud are not binding on taxpayers or 
SARS. It is submitted that the fact that recommendations of the tax Ombud are not binding is 
a safeguard which assists in ensuring that the model of the tax Ombud is fair. It was discussed 
in chapter 3 of this thesis how some stakeholders have called for the tax Ombud to have some 
final determinative authority over SARS and have the power to issue binding orders 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011b). The Parliament of South Africa, on the 
other hand, contended that giving the tax Ombud final determinative powers would go 
against international trends as none of the tax compliants oversight bodies considered by the 
legislature had final determinative authority (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 
2011b). Whilst Parliament’s contention that giving the tax Ombud final determinative powers 
would have gone against international trends is true, it is submitted that another intended or 
unintended consequence of the decision is that it brings the model of the tax Ombud closer to 
acceptable standards of fairness.  
5.2.3 Possibility of improving fairness of the model of the South African tax Ombud 
It has been submitted that provisions of the Tax Administration Act, which provide for how 
the tax Ombud should be staffed and funded, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
institutional bias. It has also been submitted that the South African legislature put in place 
safeguards in the model of the tax Ombud to ensure that the model, even though tainted with 
bias, remains fair. It is therefore submitted that if the provisions of the Tax Administration 
Act, which regulate how the tax Ombud will be staffed and funded where challenged for 
constitutionality, the staffing and funding provisions would pass constitutional scrutiny. 
Whilst the staffing and funding provisions of the tax Ombud limit the constitutional right to 
just administration in that they give rise to a suspicion of institutional bias, they, however, 
remain constitutional because the model also contains safeguards which ensure that the model 
of the Ombud is fair.  
In chapter 3 of this thesis it was discussed how Parliament has maintained that provisions of 
the Tax Administration Act, including those which establish the model of the South African 
tax Ombud, conform to South Africa’s legal and constitutional context. If the submission 
made above, that the model of the tax Ombud conforms to constitutional requirements holds, 
then it follows that Parliament’s assertions on the constitutionality of the tax Ombud model 
are also correct.  
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The current South African tax Ombud, Bernard Ngoepe, has weighed in on the debate on 
whether or not the tax Ombud is sufficiently independent from SARS. He has called for the 
office of the tax Ombud to have full legal status and be given the power to appoint its own 
human capital and receive capital independently from SARS (Ngoepe, in Wyngaard, 2015). 
The office of the South African tax Ombud is reportedly motivating for amendments to the 
Tax Administration Act which would achieve the desired institutional independence 
(Wyngaard, 2015). It has been argued in this thesis that the limitation of the right to just 
administrative action in the model of the tax Ombud conforms to the minimum requirements 
of procedural fairness in the Constitution. In light of this limitation of a constitutional right 
and calls by the current tax Ombud for greater institutional independence, it is submitted that 
it is worth considering whether there are alternative ways of providing support to the office of 
the tax Ombud which do not raise a suspicion of bias at all. 
It was discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis that the manner in which the Tax Administration 
Act provides for the staffing of the office of the tax Ombud is consistent with the models of 
other tax complaints oversight bodies considered by Parliament and reviewed in chapter 2 of 
this thesis. The manner in which the office of the tax Ombud should obtain its staff is 
captured in section 15(1) of the Tax Administration Act. According to that section, the staff 
of the tax Ombud must be employed in terms of the SARS Act and must be seconded to the 
Ombud’s office from SARS after consultation with the Commissioner for SARS.  
In chapter 3 of this thesis it was illustrated how a new model of a tax complaints oversight 
body, in the form of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation, has recently been 
established, which the South African Parliament did not have the benefit of considering in its 
deliberations. In terms of the Inspector General for Taxation Act (at section 36(1)), the staff 
of the Inspector General for Taxation must be employed in terms of the Public Service Act. 
This provision of the Inspector General of Taxation Act places the staff of the Inspector 
General of Taxation in the public service and grants the Inspector General the status of an 
Agency Head who has all the rights and powers of an employer. The Inspector General can 
therefore appoint and dismiss members of his or her staff directly 
It is submitted that if the South African Parliament followed the example in the model of the 
Inspector General of Taxation and allowed the tax Ombud to appoint his or her members of 
staff directly without secondment from SARS, then concerns raised by critics over the 
manner in which the South African tax Ombud is staffed would be addressed. If the tax 
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Ombud was permitted to appoint members of staff directly and without secondment from 
SARS then one of the grounds which give rise to a suspicion of institutional bias would also 
be eliminated. Specifically, there will no longer be a reason to suspect that if the staffing of 
the tax Ombud is derived from SARS, then the tax Ombud will not be independent of SARS 
in his or her decision making. 
The manner in which funding for the tax Ombud has been provided for is another aspect of 
the model of the tax Ombud which raises a reasonable suspicion of institutional bias. In terms 
of section 15(4) of the Tax Administration Act, the expenses incurred by the tax Ombud in 
the performance of his or her mandate must be paid out of the funds of SARS. This provision 
has led certain academics to claim that the tax Ombud will not be independent if its costs are 
borne by SARS (Mollagee, in du Preez, 2011).  The Australian Inspector General of Taxation 
is funded directly out of the Australian Federal Budget. It is submitted that if the South 
African Parliament follows the example of the model of the Inspector General of Taxation by 
providing for the tax Ombud to be funded directly from the South African National Budget, 
another source of potential bias will be eliminated.  
The amendments recommended in this thesis to the staffing and funding provisions of the 
South African tax Ombud are not new to discussions around the tax Ombud, as academics 
and experts have raised them before. It is submitted that the importance of the emergence of 
the model of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation is that, for the first time, there is 
precedent of a model of a tax compliants oversight body which addresses the funding and 
staffing needs of the oversight body differently, and in a manner which addresses the 
concerns of critics. Amendments to the model of the South African tax Ombud, based on the 
model of the Australian Inspector General of Taxation, would ensure that the model adopted 
by Parliament does not deviate from the goal of conforming to international norms, whilst at 
the same time bringing the model of the tax Ombud closer to the aspirations of the 
Constitution.   
In defence of the manner in which it provided for the staffing and funding of the tax Ombud, 
Parliament asserted that drawing staff and funds from SARS is a matter of practicality 
(Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 2011b). Having staff seconded to the tax 
Ombud from SARS, it was contended by Parliament, ensures that the staff of the tax Ombud 
are well versed with SARS’ internal processes (Parliament Standing Committee on Finance, 
2011b). In considering Parliament’s assertions, one must keep in mind the constitutional duty 
77 
 
imposed on the National Assembly by sections 8(1) and 44(4) of the Constitution, to create 
laws which conform to the Constitution. It is unfortunate that the South African Parliament 
did not go into detail on how difficult or impractical it would be for staff not drawn from 
SARS to be trained or familiarised with SARS’s internal processes. In light of Parliament’s 
duty to ensure that laws promote the values of the Constitution to the greatest extent possible, 
it is submitted that further research must be conducted and more details made available to 
determine the feasibility of giving the tax Ombud power to directly appoint members of staff 
who are not already employed by SARS.  
5.3 Conclusion  
It has been submitted that if the “reasonable suspicion of bias” test is applied to the model of 
the tax Ombud, the manner in which the funding and staffing of the Ombud is provided for 
raises a reasonable suspicion of bias. It has also been submitted that whilst a reasonable 
suspicion of institutional bias can be sustained against the model, the South African 
legislature put in place certain safeguards to ensure that the model of the tax Ombud remains 
fair. Specifically, the fact that recommendations of the tax Ombud are not binding and the 
fact that the Ombud must be an experienced legal professional before his or her appointment, 
were both identified as safeguards which ensure that fairness prevails. It was therefore 
concluded that a judicial challenge on the constitutionality of the provisions of the Tax 
Administration Act which establish the tax Ombud, based on the ”reasonable suspicion of 
bias test”, would ultimately not succeed. 
As it is presently drafted, the model of the tax Ombud appears to be constitutionally sound 
even though it is tainted with bias. In light of the South African Parliament’s duty to ensure 
that the laws it passes promote the values and spirit of the Bill of Rights, it was considered 
whether or not more could be done to limit the current infringement, albeit a constitutional 
one, on the right to just administrative action. It was submitted that the model of the newly 
formed Australian Inspector General of Taxation offers ways of providing funding and 
support to a tax complaints oversight body which would extinguish the sources of 
institutional bias in the model of the South African tax Ombud. It was recommended that the 
South African Parliament has a duty to conduct research into the feasibility of following the 
example of certain aspects of the model of the Inspector General of Taxation which would 
bring the model of the South African tax Ombud in closer harmony with the Constitution. 
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